

FMFM 1A-3A

**A Book of Fourth Generation Tactical Decision Games**



Imperial and Royal (K.u.K.) Austro-Hungarian Marine Corps

Draft of: 11 September 2007

Foreword.....	3
INTRODUCTION .....	4
GENERAL SITUATION.....	6
SOMALI HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL INFORMATION .....	7
Historical Overview .....	7
Economy .....	11
Relations with Other African States .....	11
Population .....	11
Society.....	12
Religion.....	13
Local Government .....	13
Somali Culture and Customs .....	13
Greetings.....	14
Gestures.....	14
General Etiquette .....	14
Greetings and Displays of Respect .....	15
Language.....	15
Gender Roles.....	15
Drinks, Drugs, and Indulgence .....	15
Battalion TDG #1 .....	17
Facilitator Guidance Battalion TDG #1 .....	18
Some recommended outputs:.....	19
Battalion TDG #2.....	20
Task.....	20
Considerations.....	20
Facilitator Guidance Battalion TDG #2.....	21
Facilitator Guidance.....	21
Company TDG # 1 .....	22
Tasks .....	22
Considerations.....	22
Facilitator Guidance Company TDG #1 .....	23
Task:.....	23
Other considerations .....	24
Platoon TDG # 1 .....	25
Task.....	25
Considerations.....	25
Facilitator Guidance Platoon TDG #1 .....	26
Squad TDG #1 .....	27
Task.....	27
Considerations.....	27
Squad TDG #1 Facilitator Guidance.....	28

## **Foreword**

The following book of Fourth Generation tactical decision games is intended to serve as a practical supplement to FMFM 1A, *Fourth Generation War*. It was developed by a seminar at the U.S. Marine Corps Expeditionary Warfare School, which explains its American orientation. While the operation in Somalia to which it refers was led by an Austro-Hungarian Marine Infantry brigade under *Feldzeugmeister* von Winterfeldt, the K.u.K. Admiralty believes using U.S. Marine Corps examples may encourage more objective thinking in an Austrian audience. The American text was therefore left largely unchanged, with the exception of the platoon scenario. There, the K.u.K. doctrine of *Auftragstaktik* required quite a different approach.

The task of developing suitable doctrine for state armed forces that must fight non-state opponents in Fourth Generation wars is an international one. The K.u.K. Admiralty, the Ballhausplatz and the Hofburg all welcome this largely American contribution. This draft, as edited and here published, is officially approved for use by all elements of the K.u.K. Wehrmacht.

Monteccucoli, Hofkriegsrath (See)  
K.u.K. Admiralty, Pola  
14 May, 2007

## **INTRODUCTION**

*“Fools say that they learn from experience. I prefer to learn by other people’s experience.”*

Bismarck

Current research tells us the most frequent type of decision making for leaders in a time critical environment is recognitional, which requires a large amount of experience. Research also tells us that competence in decision making is solidified by making a large number of decisions in a stressed environment. This book will attempt to bridge the gaps in a leader's experience by allowing him to replicate historical or actual combat situations and make decisions. This book was created to stimulate the thinking of leaders at all levels in the conduct of Fourth Generation wars. Leaders must understand that deciding when and how to close with an enemy may be the least important decision they make on a Fourth Generation battlefield. Instead, actions that build and nurture positive relationships with a community, local leaders and children may be the defining factors for success, as well as the primary tools that contain an insurgency, build a nation, or stop genocide. True tactical prowess often entails co-opting the local population’s will while shattering the cohesion of our Fourth Generation adversaries.

This book contains one culture to “study” and one general situation that will remain continuous throughout the publication. Readers and participants should note that decision-making in Fourth Generation war requires broader understanding of the context of the situation, of which cultural context is paramount. Therefore, unlike Third Generation (Maneuver Warfare) tactical decision games (TDGs), the reader will need to invest more time up front to become familiar with the culture in order to gain maximum benefit from each TDG. Decision-making situations will range from those made by fire team leaders to battalion commanders, but it is intended that *all leaders execute all of the TDGs*. Participants should not let pride get in the way of learning; it is important for each level of command to visualize and understand the situation from every leader’s perspective. Nor should the participant become discouraged if he does not understand all of the equipment or assets of a higher command. Instead, this should be viewed as an excellent opportunity for the facilitator to mentor each student participant.

Some of the decision points in specific TDGs will refer to the culture or “cultural decision points”. Others may refer to the original commander’s intent. These decision points are designed to demonstrate to the students that cultures and commander’s intent are lasting and must always be a part of their estimate of the situation when making a decision. As in any sound TDG, no single “correct” answer exists. The students and the facilitator should discuss the pros and cons of each possible decision and come to an understanding of each other’s individual thought processes, so they may think better collectively on the battlefield and develop implicit communication.

Each of the TDGs is designed to be “free play” between the facilitator and the students. Since they are designed to replicate the complexity of Fourth Generation war, some TDGs may take several hours or even days to complete. It is perfectly acceptable to stop the TDG and create a new technique or procedure to achieve tactical success.

## **GENERAL SITUATION**

The situation in central Somalia deteriorated further two weeks ago when Ethiopia deployed a brigade-size force from the Ogaden region of Ethiopia into Bakool and Hiraan provinces. Addis Ababa claimed that the Transitional Somali government, based in Baidoa, had requested Ethiopian forces in order to restore order and thwart the Islamic Courts Union from gaining additional territory and influence in Somalia. The Islamic Courts Union agreed to support the immediate deployment of the United Nations Peacekeeping Mission of IGAD in Somalia (IGASOM) forces to Somalia, provided that Ethiopia would withdraw its forces from Somalia within 72 hours. Ethiopia supported the proposal, but with the stipulation that K.u.K. and U.S. forces be added to the IGASOM force list. The U.N. Secretary General, the Somali Transitional Government, and the Islamic Courts Union approved the addition in keeping with the terms of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1725.

A K.u.K. Marine Corps Brigade was dispatched as the base unit of IGASOM, with force deployments as follows:

- |                           |  |
|---------------------------|--|
| 1) K.u.K. Marine Brigade: | Mogadishu                                  |
| 2) Nigerian Battalion:    | Kismayo port facility and surrounding LOCs |
| 2) Namibian Battalion:    | Bardera                                    |
| 3) Ugandan Battalion:     | Baidoa                                     |
| 4) Ghanaian Battalion:    | Odder                                      |
| 5) UAE Battalion:         | Dusa Marreb                                |
| 6) USMC Battalion:        | Beledweyne / Fearfeer                      |

### IGASOM Objectives:

- 1) Monitor and maintain security of Somali-Ethiopian border
- 2) Monitor and maintain security in Somalia
- 3) Enforce UN arms embargo
- 4) Protect members of the Transitional Federal Institution (Transitional Govt) and the Islamic Courts Union
- 5) Train local security forces

The UN Security Council will review IGASOM after a period of six months. The U.S. government has ordered the deployment of the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit to the Indian Ocean, approximately 75 nautical miles east of Mogadishu. Battalion Landing Team 2/1 and Combat Logistics Battalion 11 have been assigned the Beledweyne/Fearfeer (northern Hiraan province) area of operations, where they will operate as part of IGASOM for the next six months. Northern Hiraan province is inhabited primarily by the Darod clan, with a minority of Hawiye clansmen also in the region. No forces were deployed to this region during the 1992-1994 UNISOM or UNITAF operations in Somalia.

## SOMALI HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL INFORMATION



### Historical Overview

The Somali culture is spread over 400,000 square miles across the Horn of Africa. Even though there was not a Somali nation prior to the colonial period, there was a distinct cultural bond between the various clans, to include a common language. European powers took interest in the region upon the opening of the Suez Canal in 1867, at which time the Horn of Africa became strategically and economically important due to its access to the Red Sea.

By 1900, the British, French, Italians, and Ethiopians had carved up the area currently known as Somalia. The Ethiopians' ambitions in Somalia came from their emperor's imperialistic vision. Emperor Menelik II codified the substantial expansion of his empire by signing the Anglo-Ethiopian treaty in 1897, sparking a long rivalry between the Somalis and the Ethiopians.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Denise Herbstein, "The Alphabet War," *Africa Report*, 36, No. 3 May-June 1991, p. 68

On June 26, 1960, British Somaliland received its independence from Great Britain and united with the trust territory of Italian Somaliland. On July 1, 1960, British and Italian Somaliland united to form the Somali Republic (Somalia). Aside from deciding on the distribution of cabinet seats, the two territories united without negotiating important political and social issues. Dissatisfaction over the distribution of power between the seven major clans proved to be the government's greatest challenge, and led to a short-lived rebellion by junior military officers in 1961.<sup>2</sup>

Elections in 1967 were marred by fraud and intimidation.<sup>3</sup> Frustration and instability culminated in the assassination of Prime Minister Mohammed Ibrahim Egal on October 15, 1969. Major General Mohammed Siad Barre, the commander of the Somali armed forces, responded by taking control of Mogadishu and the rest of the country.<sup>4</sup> Initially, the people supported the coup led by Siad Barre. The Army was a trusted institution and presented a welcome alternative to the instability that characterized the preceding years of Somali politics.<sup>5</sup>

Immediately after the coup, Siad Barre established the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) and set out to design a new government. Taking into consideration the major problems facing Somalia, the SRC decided that a scientific socialism would be the most appropriate means to rule Somalia. The new government would attempt to mobilize the Somali people for public works activities, reduce illiteracy, promote agricultural cooperatives, increase cultivation on the nation's farms, nationalize the commercial sector, introduce the virtues of self-help, and promote loyalty to the regime.<sup>6</sup> Somalia was soon declared a socialist state. In 1974, Somalia signed a treaty with the Soviet Union, which provided the Soviets access to air and naval bases in Somalia in exchange for military hardware. At the same time, the Soviet Union was supplying arms to rival Ethiopia. Fearing that her western neighbor was becoming too powerful, the Somalis invaded Ethiopia in 1977. After the invasion, the Soviets ceased supplying military hardware to the Somalis, while continuing to arm the Ethiopians. In 1978, due to heavy losses, Somalia withdrew its military from Ethiopia.<sup>7</sup>

This defeat caused unrest in Somalia. Several of the clans mobilized against the government and each other. To counter the insurrection, Siad Barre created paramilitary groups to help increase strife between the clans and to destroy the uprising.<sup>8</sup> Internecine fighting erupted into full civil war in 1988. On April 3, 1988, the Somali government signed a treaty with Ethiopia, renouncing Somalia's historic claims to the Ogaden Plains - the area over which the 1977 war was fought.<sup>9</sup> By doing this, Siad Barre compromised Somali nationalism in order to crush internal rivals to his power. This event proved to be the beginning of the end for Siad Barre.

---

<sup>2</sup> *Somalia – A Government at War with its Own People* (New York: Africa Watch, January, 1990) p. 13

<sup>3</sup> Farer, pp. 96-97

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 110

<sup>5</sup> Alponso Castagno Jr., "An Interview with Mohammed Siad Barre," *Africa Report*, no. 9, December 1971, p. 23

<sup>6</sup> Farer, p. 111

<sup>7</sup> Metz, p. 20

<sup>8</sup> *Somalia – A Government at War with its Own People*, p. 31

<sup>9</sup> Daniel Compagnon, "The Somali Opposition Fronts," *Horn of Africa*, nos. 1-2, January – June 1990, p. 34

By mid-1990, Siad Barre lost control of all of Somalia with the exception of Mogadishu.<sup>10</sup> On September 3, 1990, Siad Barre dissolved his government and created a new one. The people did not recognize the new government and the fighting intensified.<sup>11</sup> At this point, the groups opposed to Siad Barre only had one thing in common: displeasure with Siad Barre and his government. The Somali National Movement (SNM), the Somali Patriotic Movement, and the United Somali Congress made attempts to unite against Siad Barre. However, the only thing they could agree on was a desire to remove Siad Barre. On January 19, 1991, Siad Barre and his supporters were forced to leave Mogadishu.<sup>12</sup> His expulsion created a power vacuum, which resulted in further chaos. With Siad Barre's departure, the opposition parties no longer had a common point of agreement. To make matters worse, the civil war, coupled by a drought, caused a famine of biblical proportions. Between 300,000 and 500,000 people starved to death, and caused the world community to take a closer look at the problems in Somalia.<sup>13</sup>

Somalia fell into a state of anarchy. The southern region of the suffered the most instability since no one group was able to dominate the area. Mogadishu was consumed by the feud between the two main powerbrokers of the United Somali Congress – Ali Mahdi Mohammed (erstwhile USC leader in the capital) and General Mohammed Farah Aideed (military commander of USC forces, operating under the banner of the Somali National Alliance, SNA).<sup>14</sup> In central Somalia, the dominant Somali Salvation Democratic Front was able to achieve some level of relative stability, as evidenced by a reduction in looting and some famine relief.

In Northwest Somalia (formerly the British colony), the SNM gained control, declared independence, and attempted to create the Somaliland Republic; however, the international community refused to recognize its independence. Despite this setback, the Somaliland Republic maintained a stable existence, aided by the overwhelming dominance of a ruling clan and economic infrastructure left behind by British, Russian, and American military assistance programs.<sup>15</sup>

The regions of Bari, Nugaal, and northern Mudug comprise a neighboring self-declared autonomous state of Puntland, which began self-governance in 1998, but does not aim at independence; it has also made strides toward reconstructing a legitimate, representative government, but has suffered some civil strife. Puntland disputes its border with Somaliland, and claims portions of eastern Sool and Sanaag.

The vast majority of the violence was concentrated in the south of the country, and took place on two levels. The first level consisted of rival clan and sub-clan fighting for control of territory

---

<sup>10</sup> Somalia – “The Mayor of Mogadishu,” *The Economist*, September 25, 1990, p. 47

<sup>11</sup> I. M. Lewis, “Somalia – Recent History,” in *Africa South of the Sahara 1992, 21<sup>st</sup> ed.*, (London, England: Europa Publications, 1991), p. 893.

<sup>12</sup> Samuel Makinda, *Seeking Peace from Chaos: Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia*, (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991), pp. 27-29.

<sup>13</sup> Robbins, Carla Anne “Waiting for America,” *U.S. News and World Report*, December 7, 1992, p. 26

<sup>14</sup> <http://www.iexplore.com/dmap/Somalia/History>

<sup>15</sup> <https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/so.html>

and resources. The second level comprised teenage gangs known as “mooryaan,” who engaged in looting and terrorizing the people.<sup>16</sup>

At this time, the SNM was arguably the most powerful group in Somalia. However, its rejection of the south created a great deal of animosity throughout the country, and the group was perceived to be just another clan-based faction, not a national movement. These perceptions led to the further disintegration of the state.

In December of 1992, President George H.W. Bush dispatched 25,000 U. S. troops to facilitate the delivery of food and other humanitarian assistance to the starving people of Somalia. Concurrently, President Bush was in the process of handing over the presidency to President-elect William J. Clinton. Beginning with the limited scope of assisting the starving people of Somalia, the mission eventually ballooned into an attempt to rebuild the failed state.

In 1993, the US transferred responsibility for the humanitarian mission to the U.N. The U.N. effort (primarily in the south) was able to alleviate famine conditions, but failed in its goal to disarm the various militias and rebuild the Somali state. In 1995, the U.N. force withdrew from Somalia after suffering significant casualties.

Farah Aideded died in 1997 and was succeeded by his son Hussein (ironically, a former US Marine). Hussein joined a group of half a dozen or so major powerbrokers with their associated militias. Several of these were backed by Ethiopia, which had assumed an increasingly active role in Somalia.

Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Americans renewed their interest in Somalia for hosting members of the militant Al-Ittihad Al-Islamiya organization, which is allegedly linked to the al-Qaeda terrorist network.<sup>17</sup> The United States and other members of the anti-terrorism coalition examined a variety of short- and long-term measures designed to address the threat of terrorism in and emanating from Somalia. The United Nations also took an increased interest in Somalia, including proposals for an increased U.N. presence and a strengthened 1992 arms embargo.

American intelligence agencies had learned that Osama Bin Laden had sent Islamic "missionaries" to Somalia from Sudan in 1991-1992. These missionaries organized a Somali welfare organization called "Al Itihad". In addition to traditional work to establish clinics and schools, Al Itihad also organized armed militias designed to attack enemies of the Islamic revolution as defined by Bin Laden. These militias, based near the confluence of the Somali, Kenyan and Ethiopian borders, conducted guerrilla attacks inside Ethiopia. The Ethiopian army, under Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, reacted strongly to these attacks, invading Somali towns to find and root out the Al Itihad fighters and administrative structures.

Somalia was the worst-hit of all African states following the December 26, 2004 tsunami. Damage was concentrated in the region of Puntland, on the tip of the Horn of Africa. The effects of the wave destroyed both homes and livelihoods, and rendered wells and reservoirs unusable.

---

<sup>16</sup>Terrence Lyons, and Ahmed I Samatar, *Somalia: State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, and Strategies for Political Reconstruction* (Washington, D.C: The Brookings Institution), pp. 21-22

<sup>17</sup><http://www.iexplore.com/dmap/Somalia/History>

Between 150 and 200 Somalis died, with thousands homeless or still unaccounted for. The U.N. has called for \$13 million to help victims of the tsunami. However, Somalia's poor infrastructure, especially its roads, will present aid agencies with a formidable challenge.<sup>18</sup>

## **Economy**

Bananas are the main cash crop and provide nearly half the country's export earnings; cotton, maize, sorghum and other crops are produced for domestic consumption. Animal products, particularly hides and skins, are another key source of revenue, exported primarily to Saudi Arabia. The fishing industry has dwindled to the level of individual small boats, but there are provisional plans to restore this to full commercial capacity. Oil and gas deposits have been located but their exploitation has been in abeyance due to the lack of an effective central government. There is little industry other than small-scale operations to meet domestic needs, mainly food-processing and oil refining. Over half of the Somali population is dependent on remittances from abroad and foreign aid from the various U.N. relief organizations.

## **Relations with Other African States**

Somalia's foreign policy in the Horn of Africa was largely driven by the considerable number of ethnic Somalis residing within neighboring states' borders. In the years following the Ogaden War, the Siad Barre government continued to support the Western Somali Liberation Front, an Ethiopian guerrilla organization opposed to the government in Addis Ababa. Likewise, Kenya had long suspected Somalia of encouraging separatist activities among the predominantly ethnic Somali population in its Northern Frontier District. Following a 1981 summit meeting with Kenyan president Daniel Arap Moi in Nairobi, Siad Barre's public renunciation of any Somali territorial claims on Kenya helped improve relations between the two states.

The Somalis of Djibouti belong to the Iise clan, and are the traditional rival of the Isaaqs who dominated the SNM. The Djibouti Iise tended to be suspicious of the Isaaq, believing that they discriminated against their Iise kinsmen in northern Somalia. This concern prompted Djibouti in 1990 to assist in the formation and training of a separate Iise movement that challenged the SNM before and after the overthrow of Siad Barre. From Djibouti's perspective, a united Somalia composed of many clans afforded more protection to the Iise than a northern republic controlled by the Isaaq.

## **Population**

The U.N. estimated Somalia's population in mid-1991 at nearly 7.7 million. This figure did not include the numerous refugees who had fled from the Ogaden in Ethiopia to Somalia in the 1970s. The population consists of three main categories: nomads (59%), settled farmers (22%), and persons in nonagricultural occupations (19%). Settled farmers were classified as people who lived in permanent settlements outside the national, regional, and district capitals. Thirty percent

---

<sup>18</sup> <http://www.iexplore.com/dmap/Somalia/History>

of the population categorized as nomads were considered semi-nomadic because of their relatively permanent settlements and shorter range of seasonal migration.<sup>19</sup>

## Society

The overwhelming majority of Somalis trace their genealogical origin to the mythical founding father, Samaale or Samaal. Even those clan-families, such as the Digil and Rahanwayn in southern Somalia, whose members in many cases do not trace their lineage directly to Samaal, readily identify themselves as Somalis, thereby accepting the primacy of Samaal as the forebear of the Somali people. By language, traditions, and way of life, the Somalis share kinship with other members of the Eastern Cushitic groups of the Horn of Africa, including the Oromo, who constitute roughly 50 percent of the population of Ethiopia; the Afar (Danakil), who straddle the Great Rift Valley between Ethiopia and Djibouti; the Beja tribes of eastern Sudan; and the Reendille (Rendilli) and Boni (Aweera) peoples of northeastern Kenya.

Genealogy constitutes the heart of the Somali social system. It is the basis of the collective Somali inclination toward internecine conflict, as well as of the Somalis' sense of being a distinct people group -a consciousness that in fact borders on xenophobia. The major branches of the Somali lineage system are four overwhelmingly pastoral nomadic clan-families. As Israeli political scientist Saadia Touval noted in his brief study of Somali nationalism, these clan-families correspond to the "Old Testament version of the tribal segmentation of the children of Israel." Like the children of Israel, the children of Samaale, with minor exceptions, are prone to internal schism and factionalism. Although the modern Somali state, which is largely a creation of European colonialism, tried in vain to exercise a measure of centralized authority through the armed forces and the civilian bureaucracy, most Somalis continued to give greater political and emotional allegiance to their lineages. In 1992 the centralized state constructed on the Somali Peninsula had all but disintegrated into its constituent lineages and clans, whose internecine wars were drenching the country in bloodshed.

Clan-families, too large and scattered for practical cooperation, in the past had no real political or economic functions. However, with the renewal and intensification of clan feuding in the wake of Siad Barre's fall from power in early 1991, the clan-families assumed crucial significance as nascent political parties pitted against one another along tribal lines in a disastrous civil war. Membership in clan-families, primary lineages, and clans was traced through males from a common male ancestor.

Ancestry as the basis of group formation and loyalty was modified, but not overridden, by the principle of *heer*. Membership in the same clan or lineage did not automatically entail certain rights and obligations, which were explicitly the subject of treaties or contracts. Thus, some clans in a clan-family might unite for political and military purposes, and some lineages within a clan might associate to pay and receive blood compensation in cases of homicide, injury, and other offenses. These alignments had a kinship base in that members often descended from a

---

<sup>19</sup>[http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field\(DOCID+so0047\)](http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+so0047))

particular wife of a common ancestor, but units formed by contract or treaty could be dissolved and new ones formed.

## **Religion**

Most Somalis are Sunni Muslims (less than 1 percent of ethnic Somalis are Christians). Loyalty to Islam reinforces distinctions that set Somalis apart from their immediate African neighbors, most of whom are either Christians (particularly the Amhara and others of Ethiopia) or adherents of indigenous African faiths.<sup>20</sup>

The Islamic ideal entails a society organized to implement Muslim precepts in which no distinction exists between secular and religious spheres. Among Somalis, this ideal had been achieved less fully in the north as compared to some groups in the settled regions of the south, where religious leaders were at one time an integral part of the social and political structure. Among nomads, the exigencies of pastoral life gave greater weight to the warrior's role, and religious leaders were expected to remain aloof from political matters.

## **Local Government**

One of the consequences of the civil strife that began in 1988 was the alienation of many local governments from the central authority of Mogadishu. Whereas the domestic situation as of May 1992 remained unstable, the trend appeared to be toward a decentralized system of local government similar to that existing prior to the 1969 coup. The constitution of 1961 had provided for the decentralization of administrative functions wherever feasible, and throughout the country elected councils had been responsible for municipal and district government. However, direct supervision of local government affairs by central authorities also was part of Somalia's recent history, and a return to a centralized system could not be ruled out. Indeed, the local government structures that existed in 1992 were the same ones that had been established during Siad Barre's dictatorship.

All levels of local government were staffed by personnel of the national civil service who had been assigned to their posts by the central authorities. Local councils were permitted to plan local projects, impose local taxes, and borrow funds (with prior ministerial approval) for development projects.

## **Somali Culture and Customs**

Somali men typically wear western pants or ma'awis (kilt), western shirts or shawls, and may wear a colorful turban or koofiyad (embroidered cap) on their head. Women usually wear one of the following:

---

<sup>20</sup> <http://countrystudies.us/somalia/44.htm>

- Direh, a long, billowing dress worn over petticoats.
- Coantino, a four-yard cloth tied over shoulder and draped around the waist.
- Toob, commonly worn throughout Africa.
- Hijab, and head scarves are very common.<sup>21</sup>

## Greetings

Somali warmly greet each other with handshakes; however, shaking hands with the opposite sex is avoided. Common verbal greetings include:

- Assalam Alaikum (Peace be upon you)
- Nabad miyaa (is their peace)
- Subah wanaagsan (Good morning)
- Galab wanaagsan (Good afternoon)
- Habeeb wanaagsan (Good night)<sup>22</sup>

## Gestures

Somali use hand and arm gestures to dramatize speech. Many ideas are expressed through specific hand gestures:

- A swift twist of the open hand means "nothing" or "no"
- Snapping fingers may mean "long ago" or "so on"
- A thumb under the chin indicates "fullness"
- It is impolite to point the sole of one's foot or shoe at another person
- It is impolite to use the index finger to call somebody; that gesture is used for calling dogs.<sup>23</sup>

The American "thumbs up" is considered obscene.

## General Etiquette

The right hand is considered the clean and polite hand to use for daily tasks such as eating, writing, and greeting people. If a child begins to show left-handed preference, the parents will actively try to train him or her to use the right hand. Thus left-handedness is very uncommon in Somalia. As proscribed by Muslim tradition, married women are expected to cover their bodies including their hair.<sup>24</sup> Saving face is important to Somalis so humor and indirectness is often used in conversation. Eye contact while communicating with a person of a different sex is taboo

---

<sup>21</sup> [http://www.humanrights.state.mn.us/somali\\_culture.html](http://www.humanrights.state.mn.us/somali_culture.html)

<sup>22</sup> [http://www.humanrights.state.mn.us/somali\\_culture.html](http://www.humanrights.state.mn.us/somali_culture.html)

<sup>23</sup> [http://www.humanrights.state.mn.us/somali\\_culture.html](http://www.humanrights.state.mn.us/somali_culture.html)

<sup>24</sup> [http://ethnomed.org/ethnomed/cultures/somali/somali\\_cp.html#etiquette](http://ethnomed.org/ethnomed/cultures/somali/somali_cp.html#etiquette)

and avoided. Generally speaking, Somali culture places a premium on personal relationships and respect.

### **Greetings and Displays of Respect**

Many social norms are derived from Islamic tradition, and thus may be similar to other Islamic countries. The common way to greet someone is to say salam alechem (roughly translated as "God bless you") and to shake their hand. Due to Islamic tradition, men and women do not touch each other. Thus men shake the hands of other men, and women shake each other's hands. When departing, the common phrase is nabad gelyo ("goodbye"). Respect is paid to the elders of the community. Elders are addressed as "aunt" or "uncle," even if they are strangers.<sup>25</sup>

### **Language**

The universal language in Somalia is Somali, an Afro-asiatic language that is closely related to Oromiffa and more distantly related to Swahili and the Semitic languages of Arabic, Hebrew, and Amharic. Although written for many years, a uniform orthography was not adopted until 1973. As the vast majority of the population is Muslim, Arabic is a second common language. Until the 1970's, education was conducted in the language of colonial rule, thus older Somalis from northern Somalia are conversant in English and those from southern Somalia are conversant in Italian. The government sponsored literacy campaigns in the 1970s and 1980s, including a free education at all levels until 1991.<sup>26</sup>

### **Gender Roles**

As in many Islamic cultures, adult men and women are separated in most aspects of life. Although some women in the cities hold jobs, the preferred role is for the husband to work and the wife to stay at home with the children. Female and male children participate in the same educational programs and literacy among women is relatively high.<sup>27</sup>

### **Drinks, Drugs, and Indulgence**

Qat, (also spelled khat, chat, or kat) is a mild stimulant used by some Somalis. It is derived from fresh leaves of the catha edulis tree. When the leaves are chewed, the active stimulant ingredient, cathinone, is released. Qat is felt to make ones thoughts sharper and is often used in conjunction with studying. It is only used by men, and its use is more common in Northern Somalia and the Ogaden. Qat historically has been listed by the DEA as a schedule IV drug

---

<sup>25</sup> [http://ethnomed.org/ethnomed/cultures/somali/somali\\_cp.html#respect](http://ethnomed.org/ethnomed/cultures/somali/somali_cp.html#respect)

<sup>26</sup> [http://ethnomed.org/ethnomed/cultures/somali/somali\\_cp.html#language](http://ethnomed.org/ethnomed/cultures/somali/somali_cp.html#language)

<sup>27</sup> [http://ethnomed.org/ethnomed/cultures/somali/somali\\_cp.html#gender](http://ethnomed.org/ethnomed/cultures/somali/somali_cp.html#gender)

(unrestricted), however recently it was changed to a schedule I drug (most restricted) due to concerns for potential abuse.<sup>28</sup>

---

<sup>28</sup> [http://ethnomed.org/ethnomed/cultures/somali/somali\\_cp.html#gender](http://ethnomed.org/ethnomed/cultures/somali/somali_cp.html#gender)

## ***Battalion TDG #1***

You are the Commanding Officer of Battalion Landing Team (BLT) 2/1. The BLT has been tasked to train the Transitional Federal Institution's (TFI) security forces, enforce a U.N. arms embargo, and maintain security in Fearfeer in order to protect members of the TFI and facilitate maintaining order in your area of operations.

You are currently off the coast of Somalia and expect to deploy the BLT in the next 48 hours.

### **Tasks**

- Develop your estimate of the situation from the perspective of the BLT commander.
- Develop your strategy for interacting with the local population and local leaders.
- What questions (requests for information) do you need answered to facilitate your decisions?
- How will you attempt to resolve the tensions in your area of operations (AO)?
- Develop a method of measuring success and failure.

### **Considerations**

- Your AO has a history of tension between the Darod and Hawiye clans. While the Darod clan is the majority in Somalia, the Hawiye clan comprises the majority in your AO.
- The TFI has started to stand up local security forces across the country. The majority of leadership positions in your AO were assigned to members of the Darod Clan.
- Despite the political resolution, tensions between the two clans are high.
- Of the 7 major sub-clans (warlords) in your AO, three are against the TFI and do not want foreign troops on Somali soil; three have not made a stand; and one, the group with the least influence, supports the TFI and foreign intervention.
- The majority of the local population is tired of the violence and wants security and stability. While they do not support foreign intervention, they will more than likely tolerate any force that will bring security.
- Your higher headquarters has not provided much direction beyond the guidance in the IGASOM objectives. The overarching message is that he wants results! It is up to you how you obtain them.
- How will you enforce an arms embargo when every citizen in your AO relies on personal weapons for security?
- How will you deal with the three clans that oppose you?

- What do you do with the three groups that remain uncommitted?
- How will you integrate your unit's efforts with the TFI forces?
- How will you deal with the tension between the Darod and Hawiye clans?

### **Facilitator Guidance Battalion TDG #1**

- How would you go about conducting a leader's reconnaissance? What unique aspects must be considered with respect your mission and the situation?
- Will you operate unilaterally, or will you integrate your unit with local TFI forces?
- What are the factors affecting the deployment of your battalion? The key consideration at this point is to *orient on the population*, since that is where your unit will be decisive. Can the local infrastructure support a dispersed force? How will your patrolling and resupply activities impact local traffic and commerce?
- How will we identify areas controlled by different tribes? What will the intelligence / targeting cycle look like?
- How will you accomplish the task to train TFI forces? Will training efforts be centralized at the battalion, or decentralized among the companies? How will this impact your troop-to-task considerations in maintaining security in your AO?
- What will information operations themes will be essential to accomplishing your mission? Who has the authority to approve modifications to themes and messages? Ensure the Marines know what the message/theme is and then pass that on to the local leaders.
- What criteria will you establish to effectively enforce the U.N. arms embargo? Which weapons will be considered illegal? If the arms embargo guidance from higher is not clear then request clarification.
- If the Hawiye clan does not send representation to the initially meeting, and it is a good chance they will not, how will you respond? Consider the imperatives of legitimacy and impartiality in accomplishing your mission.
- While you have not be formally tasked with conducting civil affairs or rebuilding infrastructure, you can be sure the population will expect assistance. Establish guidelines for what you type of projects you will support in the area. Ensure there is an identified purpose for the project.
- Establish measures of effectiveness and means to assess your progress.
- Lastly, how might command and control at the battalion level differ in this situation as compared to a conventional tactical mission? How can the battalion commander and his staff make the most effective contributions to mission accomplishment?

**Some recommended outputs:**

- Warning Order
- Cross Deck Requirement
- Initial Task Organization
- Commander's Intent
- Concept of Operation
- Concept of Information Operations
- Concept of Logistical Support
- Tasking Paragraphs

## ***Battalion TDG #2***

You are the commanding officer of Battalion Landing Team (BLT) 2/1. Your mission is to train the Transitional Federal Institution's (TFI) security forces, and maintain security in your area of operations in order to protect members of the TFI.

You have been on the ground for one week when Fox Company reports contact with a group of about 45 armed men who claim to be members of the TFI security forces. The company commander's first impression of the group is that they look more like a rag tag mob than a security force.

### **Task**

- Develop a plan for dealing with this security force.

### **Considerations**

- Your BLT has been assigned an AO that consists of 60% Hawiye, 35% Darod and 5% various minor clans.
- All 45 members of the security force are members of the Darod clan.
- Neither your TFI liaison officer nor K.u.K. Marine Brigade headquarters have any information confirming that the group is a component of the TFI security forces.
- Fox Company Commander reports that based on initial atmospheric, the group has credibility among the Darod members of the local population.
- While tensions are mounting in the Hawiye sectors of your AO, the security situation has remained favorable in the Darod sectors thus far.
- The group leader has expressed a desire for his forces to be trained by the U.S.
- What steps can you take to determine whether the group is a credible security force, rather than bandits?
- What opportunities might you be able to exploit if this group is indeed a contributing factor to the relative stability in the Darod sectors of your AO? What risks do you assume if you choose to work with the group?

## ***Facilitator Guidance Battalion TDG #2***

### **Facilitator Guidance**

- Elders within the Darod sectors will be able to provide insight as to the true nature of the armed group's activities. The battalion commander must consider the appropriate level of command representation to meet with the elders. The general rule is for the lowest echelon of command to conduct such meetings. The battalion commander may be tempted to gain a first-hand impression by meeting with the elders immediately. However, such an approach may undercut the authority of the company commander, inhibiting productive dialogue and cooperation in the future. One favorable course of action would entail the company commander conducting the initial meetings. If the security situation remains favorable, the battalion commander may then want to visit in person (in the company of his company commander) to discuss civil affairs projects as an incentive for continued progress and stability, and thereby reinforcing success.
- Even if the armed group is contributing to security in the Darod sector, a key concern is that the group may be perpetrating violence against their rival clan in the Hawiye sectors. One way to verify this is to consult the local Hawiye leadership; however, their input may be skewed as well. The battalion commander may want to task his intelligence assets to gather information on this group and its activities. At the same time, the battalion can monitor this group by assigning a Marine squad or platoon to conduct combined patrols. This could in fact be made a stipulation for receiving training from the battalion. If the group refuses, suspicions might be justified. If the group agrees to combined operations in concert with training, this may present a gap to be exploited.
- This is a good opportunity to re-examine your mission statement and higher headquarters' intent. Since the mission is to maintain security, cooperation with the group (if vetted as outlined above) would contribute to enhanced security. Some might criticize this arrangement since it appears to polarize security forces along ethnic lines. Since your mission does not require (nor does the situation appear to permit) multi-ethnic integration of TFI forces, combined operations with the Darod group would appear to contribute to mission accomplishment. This is a good opportunity to emphasize the importance of finding local solutions to Fourth Generation conflicts, rather than attempting to create a security force in our own image.

## **Company TDG # 1**

You are the company commander of Golf Company, Battalion Landing Team (BLT) 2/1. Your company has been assigned an area of operations (AO) that is about 50 kilometers from your battalion headquarters. Your AO has been relatively peaceful. The biggest issue you have had to deal with has been a shortage of fuel, which results in the local residents waiting in line for up to two days. You have developed a good relationship with a local tribal leader who is widely respected throughout your AO. He has come to you on several occasions to complain about American forces bypassing the fuel line, going to the front and fueling their vehicles. He has stated that these actions are seriously diminishing the people's respect for your forces. You have assured him that your forces have their own fuel and do not use local fuel, but promised to investigate. The tribal leader appears agitated that you are not taking him at his word.

Upon further investigation, you discover that other U.N. forces traveling through your AO are fueling their vehicles ahead of local residents. You have a meeting with the tribal leader in one hour.

### **Tasks**

- Develop a strategy for repairing your relationship with the tribal leader.
- Develop a plan for dealing with the UN forces.
- Develop a plan for repairing your relationship with the people.

### **Considerations**

- The tribal leader and the local people do not make a distinction between U.S. Marine units and other U.N. units, essentially viewing all IGASOM forces as outsiders.
- Regardless of the unit responsible for the fuel incidents, the tribal leader holds you responsible for their conduct, since you are the senior military commander in the region.
- A major supply route that connects U.N. units runs through your AO.

## Facilitator Guidance Company TDG #1

### Task:

- Develop a strategy for repairing your relationship with the tribal leader.
    1. It is very important to admit to the local leader that he was right about the forces jumping to the head of the fuel line. In other words, you must acknowledge that he was right and you were wrong. While you certainly should outline that your Marines have not been involved in these incidents, you should accept responsibility nonetheless, since you are the military commander in the AO. The difficult part of this interchange is to maintain your credibility in your AO but at the same time let him know that the offending forces come from another unit. The local leader knows that you are supposed to be in charge of the area so it is not a good idea to just throw up your hands and say, "those are not my men."
    2. You will also want to spend some time thanking the leader for bringing this situation to your attention. Take the time to build his ego a little but do not overdo it because you must still maintain your respectability. Part of this discussion should focus on how the local leader came to find out about this problem. You might find that the local leader is really only upset because the U.N. forces are not paying him a "tribute" for the privilege of cutting in line. The local unrest he is reporting might be something he is creating to cause a reaction from you.
    3. Ask the tribal leader what his thoughts are concerning the forces transiting through the area.
    4. The overall plan might look something like this.
      - Greetings, small talk about the weather.
      - Apologize that you did not know about this earlier but you investigated the issue.
      - Brief explanation about exactly which forces are cutting the line.
      - Ask him how he found out about the problem.
      - Assure him that you have talked to your higher headquarters about this issue but you do not have an answer yet.
      - Have a plan for preventing the U.N. convoys jumping to the head of the line.
  - Develop a plan for dealing with the UN and associated forces jumping the line.
    1. Consider manning a checkpoint at the fuel station. It is imperative that when U.N. convoys enter your area you make them aware they will not be allowed to obtain fuel from the fuel station. You must tell them ahead of time in order to prevent an unfavorable situation developing at the fuel station.
-

2. The check point you establish should be a combined checkpoint. Initially it should be manned by local forces and Marines the entire time the fuel station is open. Once everyone in the area knows they cannot jump ahead in the line, then you will be able to reduce the Marine presence. In Fourth Generation conflicts, troop-to-task ratios will almost always be marginal. Establishing an additional checkpoint at the fuel station may be a manpower drain, but it will pay dividends by addressing the local populace's grievances.
  3. Consider making special arrangements for U.N. forces to obtain fuel without disrupting the local populace.
- Develop a plan for repairing your relationship with the people.
    1. Ensure that the credit for resolving the issue goes to the tribal leader. Your bid for success rests largely on the credibility and legitimacy of local leaders. If the unit commander attempts to take personal credit for resolving the issue among the people, he risks alienating the tribal leader, who may limit or discontinue cooperation with your unit due to a loss of face.

### **Other considerations**

What actions will you take if higher headquarters states that the U.N. forces should be allowed to cut to the head of the line and that you must ensure their safety?

If the local leader is accepting bribes and allowing people to cut ahead in line, how would you respond?

What is the overall problem with fuel and can you influence it? Is it a supply problem or a distribution problem? Can civil affairs units coordinate funding to build additional fuel stations? If the problem is supply, is there a way to get more fuel in the AO?

How will you deal with the black or gray market fuel distribution in your AO? Will you allow people to sell fuel from the side of the road? How significant is this problem, or is it a problem at all?

## ***Platoon TDG # 1***

You are the platoon commander of 1st Platoon, Echo Company, Battalion Landing Team (BLT) 2/1. Your platoon has been tasked with establishing a vehicle check point on a major road leading to your area of operations (AO). Your purpose is to prevent illegal weapons smuggling into your AO in accordance with arms embargo. Your BLT commander has authorized one AK-47 per family for self protection. Your company commander has tasked you with manning this checkpoint for 24 hours. It is located on a four-lane road in an open area.

### **Task**

- Develop an order to issue your subordinates, generate a logistical request for all gear you will need to run the checkpoint, and a troop rotation/rest plan.

### **Considerations**

- Local weapons smugglers will know about your checkpoint as soon as it is established, if not before.
- The local population is not likely to react favorably to being stopped and searched by foreign troops.
- Weapons are not just for security in the local culture. They are also prestige objects, symbols of wealth, power and masculinity, and display items.
- Is the checkpoint you have been tasked to establish a promising way to accomplish the mission? If you decide it is not, what are you going to do?

## Facilitator Guidance Platoon TDG #1

1. Pay close attention to the platoon task organization. The platoon must have enough people to effectively segregate and search vehicles and people while constantly maintaining security.
2. Part of the unit should be task organized to chase down vehicles that see the vehicle checkpoint and attempt to turn around. These vehicles are suspects for breaking the weapons embargo or other illicit activity.
3. Consider moving the checkpoint when darkness falls to limit the effectiveness of any indirect fire threat. (If the platoon commander does not request this from his company commander then the facilitator should talk him through some of the dangers associated with remaining in position for extended periods of time.)
4. If the platoon commander establishes the checkpoint as directed despite its obvious ineffectiveness for accomplishing the mission, the facilitator should review the nature of *Auftragstaktik* with the platoon commander. A reasonable mission order would be to “interdict illegal weapons smuggling in the area of operations” rather than stating specifically how, where, and for how long to carry out the operation. Also discuss the effectiveness of “snap” vehicle checkpoints in which the platoon remains in one location no longer than 30-45 minutes. Multiple snap vehicle checkpoints are more advantageous than long-duration checkpoints for a number of reasons, such as avoiding presenting a lucrative target for enemy indirect fires (mortars or rockets) or car bombs, as well as minimizing the disruption to the local populace. Snap checkpoints are often an effective deterrent to smuggling, but will seldom yield seizure of a significant amount of weapons. Cultivation of a robust human intelligence network is a valuable tool in accomplishing your mission.
5. If, as the situation clearly requires, the platoon commander does something other than establish a checkpoint, the facilitator should give strong praise for the most imaginative alternatives while at the same time drawing out the possible consequences of each action.

Note: Points four and five were added by the K.u.K. Admiralty as part of their review of the proposed draft, as was the “Considerations” section of the problem.

## **Squad TDG #1**

You are the squad leader for 2nd Squad, 1st Plt, Fox Company, Battalion Landing Team (BLT) 2/1. Your squad has been conducting security patrols in the company AO, which has remained peaceful for the past two weeks. This peace has resulted in the opening of several schools and the streets have been full of playing children. The local population has begun to embrace your presence and you have developed good relationships with many members of the community in your AO. Despite this success, the children of the area have begun to think it is funny to throw rocks at your patrols. While the children look at this as a game, several of your Marines have been slightly injured by the rocks. The Marines of your squad are growing tired of this and want to take action to stop this behavior.

### **Task**

- Develop a plan that you think will make the children stop throwing rocks without upsetting the local population.

### **Considerations**

- How do you maintain credibility with the local population while preventing your subordinates from lashing out?
- Is the rock throwing a game or is someone encouraging or rewarding the children for throwing rocks? How do you find out?

## **Squad TDG #1 Facilitator Guidance**

The focus of this TDG is de-escalation. The Marines conducting the TDG should be discouraged from developing solutions that incorporate tactics such as stun grenades or throwing rocks back at the children. Encourage the Marines to come up with creative solutions, example of which may include:

- Consult the local elders to enlist their support in stopping this behavior. Explain that despite the fact that the children think it is a game, some of your Marines have sustained injuries as a result of this behavior. Stress that you respect their culture and that a local solution to the problem enacted by either local leaders or the children's' parents is much more appropriate than your Marines using non-lethal weapons.
- Avoid the areas where kids gather during "high risk" times.
- Conduct combined patrols in the area rather than unilateral Marine patrols. Allow the local security forces to deal with the children (while remaining vigilant for any abuses by the local forces).

In summary, the ideal solution will focus on de-escalation and avoiding a situation that will upset the local population, while at the same time not appearing weak to the locals.