by Charles Knight

Key advisors to Barack Obama have put forward an Iraq withdrawal policy which they have labeled “conditional engagement.” In their words:

“Under this strategy, the … time hori­zon for redeployment would be negotiated with the Iraqi government and nested within a more assertive approach to regional diplomacy. The United States would make clear that Iraq and America share a common interest in achieving sustainable stability in Iraq, and that the United States is willing to help support the Iraqi gov­ernment and build its security and governance capacity over the long-term, but only so long as Iraqis continue to make meaningful political progress.” [from Colin Kahl, Michele A. Flournoy and Shawn Brimley, "Shaping the Iraq Inheritance", Center for a New American Security, June 2008. < http://www.cnas.org/en/cms/?2311> ]

This policy may as well be called “conditional withdrawal” because the degree and speed of withdrawal is related directly to “conditions” of progress that are largely dependent on the cooperation of Iraqis and on continuing intrusive military activity by the US. Such conditionality of withdrawal makes this centrist Democratic policy approach much closer than many realize to the Republican position of “staying until victory.” In this case victory is defined as “sustainable stability.”

The goal of stable, secure, well-governed, and prosperous Iraq is a worthy one, especially for Iraqis. It is the work of decades, not years. It is principally a political job and it is principally the job of Iraqis. We must get over the notion that stabilizing Iraq is something for the US to do; that it is something the US can do. US troops have in effect been destabilizing Iraq since the invasion and Iraq can only move so far toward re-stabilizing as long as US troops remain in that country.

Nevertheless, Iraqis will continue to need substantial international support. Since US intervention is a contributing factor to Iraqi national problems, effective outside help will have to move through international agency, not bilateral arrangements or narrow multi-lateral arrangements dominated by Western nations. Support dominated by the US will continue to get in the way of progress. Therefore any strategy that involves staying militarily in order to achieve stability is in fatal tension with itself. It is easy to see how such a strategy will keep US armed forces in Iraq for decades to come.

Looking at the details of the conditional engagement policy proposal, one finds structures of dependency that have no end point. For instance, the Center for a New American Security report < http://www.cnas.org/en/cms/?2311 > suggests that the US will need to manage the Sons of Iraq formations the US has been supporting by “preventing them from acquiring heavy weapons, tightly restricting their jurisdictions and movement, and closely monitoring them for compliance so that they do not rub up against rival militias.” Such a level of control over native forces is more typical of a colonial power, and certainly not a reasonable mission for an army that is planning to leave anytime soon. Embrace that sort of mission and you will be there for a very long time.

If Barack Obama is elected President, it is likely that his defense and foreign policy team will include a significant number of centrists who will want to pursue sustainable stability in Iraq with continued application of US military power. Such is the composition of the Democratic national security establishment in Washington. There are also other advisors who believe that the Iraq war is a turning point for a US middle east policy that needs significant revision and renovation. If Obama is inclined toward the centrists and follows their advice he is likely to face considerable frustration in meeting his goal of ending the war in Iraq. Sooner or later he will turn his attention to other options. It is well worth the effort in the meantime to develop those options.

I was one of the organizers of the Task Force for a Responsible Withdrawal from Iraq < http://www.comw.org/pda/taskforceresponsiblewithdrawal.html >. We have published a set of 25 initiatives that complement and support a short timeline military withdrawal. We call for getting all the troops out within eighteen months while also remaining responsibly engaged by non-military means in Iraq and the region. We would disengage from failed policies of the past — policies based on strategic error and that have led us into a strategic disaster.

Military occupation of Iraq is the central feature of this strategic error. No amount of clever adjustment at the tactical and operational levels will get us where we need to be. Only strategic change can get us on the road to recovery.

Three fundamental strategic errors have been made:

First, the US miscalculated what might be accomplished by force of arms and failed to appreciate the limits on the utility of military power;

Second, our leaders in Washington failed to appreciate the power and dynamics of identity politics… and the likely reaction to foreign occupation.

Third, the US failed to take seriously the importance of international cooperation and legitimacy in the eyes of the world.

The price the US and others are paying for these blunders is not measured in blood and treasure alone — although these costs are already terribly high. One example of these extraordinary costs we have addressed in the Task Force report:

There are now millions of refugees and millions of internally displaced persons, totaling nearly 15% of the Iraq population. The displacement of a proportional number of Americans would mean: 45 million forced from their homes, the equivalent of emptying out the population of America’s ten largest cities. This happened under the American watch in Iraq. It is an immense failure for an occupying power; one still receiving the most ‘care less’ of responses from Washington.

In addition the US has:

• weakened and misdirected its security assets — since 2004 the Army has been at an unsustainable operational tempo with accumulating harm to that service;
• severely damaged its reputation, especially in the Muslim world;
• damaged its alliances;
• created a catalyst for communal conflict and provided a recruiting gift to Iraqi extremists;
• provided a motivator for jihadism and for terrorist tactics worldwide;
• handed Iran strategic and economic benefits which accrue every day US troops remain in Iraq;
• tarnished the meaning and the promise of democracy — and undermined efforts to promote it.

Moving from the level of strategy to consider US operational policy in Iraq, it becomes clear that we must proceed on an entirely new basis — one that puts the Iraqis at the center and that gathers the international community to our side as equal partners in supporting reconciliation and recovery for this traumatized society.

The “new basis” necessarily begins with setting a credible — meaning short — timeline for withdrawal. This, because:

• Withdrawal is essential to drawing the remaining “rejectionists”, Sunni and Shia alike, into the political process;
• Withdrawal is essential to further reducing the appeal of al Qaeda in Mesopotamia;
• Withdrawal is essential to restoring the credibility of the Iraqi government as sovereign and as a leader of an inclusion and reconciliation process, and;
• Withdrawal is essential to unblocking international cooperation — especially that of key contact states — who can do more to help stabilize Iraq.

Only some of the benefits of setting a credible withdrawal timeline will materialize simply by announcing the withdrawal. In addition it will take effective diplomacy and considerable resources, before and after, to draw the rejectionists in and catalyze international cooperation and support. Much of this is specified in the Task Force Report < http://www.comw.org/pda/0806taskforcereport.html >.

The “new basis” of policy implies a new realism about what the US can hope to accomplish in Iraq and how. It means finally coming to terms with a number of uncomfortable facts:

• American military presence and action has been part of the problem. … It is an affront to Iraqi national and communal identities. And a stimulant to rejectionism and insurgency and violence;
• From the start, the US has been handicapped by being an alien power in Iraq. It means US troops are judged by a different standard. And it tars everyone who works with the US … it makes suspect every process the US presumes to lead.
• US “moral authority”… the ability to truly win “hearts and minds” in sufficient numbers has been undercut by too much firepower and too many house raids, checkpoint killings, road rams, jailings, and varied abuses of power. (Others may have done much worse, but that doesn’t matter. The US in Iraq is judged differently because it is an alien presence in Iraqi culture.)
• US authority is also undercut because US troops and contractors wear their privilege and self-interest on their sleeves. It’s evident in the US insistence of immunity for its nationals and in the details of basing agreements and oil deals the US tries to cut.

So we shouldn’t be surprised, when opinion polls find that very few Iraqis think the US is doing a good job in their country. Nor should we be surprised when focus groups conducted for the coalition military command find, as the Washington Post reports
< http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/12/18/AR2007121802262_pf.html >
that “Iraqis of all sectarian and ethnic groups believe that the U.S. military invasion is the primary root of the violent differences among them, and see the departure of ‘occupying forces’ as the key to national reconciliation.” Sentiments like these contribute to Maliki’s recent push back on basing agreements and to his support of a withdrawal timeline.

The surge has brought down the level of violence… and today the level of violence in Iraq is comparable, proportionately, to the worst years of the “Troubles” in Northern Ireland. It is a very good thing that fewer are dying in Iraq, but that improvement alone is far from sufficient evidence from which to conclude that US policy is now on the right track.

And how did the reduction in violence come about? Not principally by the application of increased US military power or by adopting new counter-insurgency doctrine, but by accommodating and supporting the desire of Sunnis for local control and by “coming to terms” with Moqtada al-Sadr and by his decision, encouraged by Iran, to stand-down his armed contest with the Badr brigades.

As we assess the so-called “surge strategy,” it is important to note its limits:

• The surge has reduced violence by leveraging and reinforcing the inter-communal and intra-communal divisions that plague Iraq — think of the walls American soldiers have built to separate Sunni and Shia enclaves in Baghdad; And,
• The fact remains that none of the powerful Iraqi groups or leaders with whom the US is currently allied share the American vision or purpose — not even the Kurds. US alliances inside Iraq are marriages of convenience — and shaky ones at that.

Indeed, the surge marks the limit of what the United States might accomplish in Iraq by military means. Now the task is to bring into the political process most of the remaining rejectionists and to catalyze the type of international support that will facilitate this inclusion and a national accord. And this requires US military withdrawal.

Some proponents of staying warn us about backsliding if the US leaves, including the specter of a failed state wherein al Qaeda will thrive. This warning displays a basic misunderstanding of al Qaeda in Mesopotamia which was founded as a reaction to the US invasion. When the US leaves Iraq it looses its primary motivation for its adherents and rather than thrive, it is very likely to fade.

In addition, political instability does not equal a failed state — there are many ways of avoiding that outcome that do not involve keeping US troops there indefinitely. Iraq is a traumatized society and that condition is a major contributing factor to why Iraq will be politically volatile for a long time to come. But seeking to shape or control Iraqi politics with Army brigades is to perpetuate the use of a blunt and inappropriate tool that does at least as much harm as it does good. Staying means staying for a very long time! US presence is one cause of the violence - its troops will always be seen as a foreign invader to be resisted.

If it is strategically important to leave, we must understand that it is an illusion to think we’ll just linger a while longer to fix things up in Iraq before we leave. As long as the US stays in Iraq the goal of national reconciliation will recede into the time horizon like a mirage in the desert.

Adapted from a panel presentation on The Future of the U.S. Military Presence in Iraq < http://www.usip.org/events/2008/0725_us_iraq.html > at the United States Institute of Peace, 25 July 2008. The panel consisted of Kimberly Kagan, Colin Kahl, Charles Knight, and Rend al-Rahim, with Daniel Serwer, moderator. Charles Knight is the co-director of the Project on Defense Alternatives (http://www.comw.org/pda/).

Comments are welcome; please observe our comment policy.

Despite the recent drop in the price of oil, the world economy is still sailing into troubled waters. The U.S. credit crisis is intensifying and spreading to Britain. Europe is moving toward recession. The international financial system continues to depend on mountains of debt. If the financial panic the Federal Reserve Bank has thus far managed to stave off materializes, we could witness a meltdown of historic proportions.

What does all this portend for Fourth Generation warfare? Regrettably, it means the omens are favorable for some non-state entities, especially those which compete with the state in the delivery of vital social services.

Here we must remind ourselves that the root and origin of Fourth Generation war is a crisis of legitimacy of the state. One of the functions the state is now expected to perform, in free market as well as socialist countries, is to ensure that the economy functions as well. A world-wide financial panic followed by a world recession or depression would mean the state was failing in one of its core functions. That in turn would further diminish the legitimacy of the state.

Wilsonians and other “democracy” hucksters think that a state’s legitimacy is a function of elections. Even in established democracies such as the United States, those elections are becoming empty forms, political kabuki in which citizens are not given an opportunity to vote against the New Class. In most of the world elections do not even determine which collection of thieves will next get to plunder the treasury. The game is blatantly rigged.

In poor countries, the state’s legitimacy is more a function of its ability to provide vital services than the election of ju-ju. Often, those services include allowing people to eat. Most people’s diets depend on subsidized state rations, such as the bread ration in Egypt. Recent riots there when the issue of cheap bread was disrupted showed the potential power of hungry mobs.

A world-wide depression would cause hardship in rich countries. In poor countries, it would quickly lead to widespread starvation. The state would no longer be able to provide the subsidized rations millions of its citizens rely on. The rise in world food prices already underway would put states in a double squeeze: the state’s revenues would be falling at the same time that the difference between market and subsidized prices was growing. Add in global financial panic where credit dries up and we will see the number of failed states rise rapidly.

In the Great Depression of the 1930s, states’ economic failure brought governments and even systems of government, including democracy, into question. In both Europe and the United States, Communism and Fascism gained certain popularity because in the Soviet Union, Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, everyone had a job. But the state itself was not challenged, because there was no alternative to the state.

Now, there is. Intelligent Fourth Generation entities, ranging from some drug gangs through organizations such as Hezbollah, are competing directly with the state for people’s primary loyalty. If those Fourth Generation entities can provide basic services, including food, when the state can no longer do so, they will gain the legitimacy that state is losing. In Fourth Generation war, that is a bigger win than any potential military victory.

In terms of 4GW theory, the lessons here are two. First, a global economic crisis is likely to lead to a much deeper crisis, a widespread existential crisis of the state itself. Second, the Fourth Generation entities that benefit from this crisis will be those that provide basic services more effectively than can the state. Once again, just as from a military perspective, we see that the “Hezbollah model” is the most promising model for Fourth Generation, non-state organizations. That model includes a highly competent military that can defeat state armed forces. But it employs its military capability sparingly, fighting only when attacked or when a low-risk, high-payoff military opportunity presents itself, which will be seldom. For 4GW entities as for states, the outcome of wars will remain unpredictable. Instead, the Hezbollah model focuses day-to-day on providing services to the people, building its legitimacy vis-à-vis the state and gaining the population’s primary loyalty. At some point, that loyalty will become so strong that not even military defeat by a state’s armed forces will destroy it.

Notes:

1. Do not assume the war between Russia and Georgia is over. So long as Mr. Saakashvili remains Georgia’s President, he will continue to challenge and taunt Russia. As the last week has made plain, he will be encouraged to do so by the Bush White House, his partner in folly. If Russia does not force his removal from office now, it will have to come back and finish the job.
2. The will no On War column next week, as I will be in Ostland.

William S. Lind, expressing his own personal opinion, is Director for the Center for Cultural Conservatism for the Free Congress Foundation.

To interview Mr. Lind, please contact (no e-mail available):

Mr. William S. Lind
Free Congress Foundation
1423 Powhatan Street, # 2
Alexandria, Virginia 22314
Direct line: 703 837-0483

What interests does the United States have at stake in the war between Russia and Georgia? Only one: that we remain out of it.

It almost passes belief to think that the Bush administration, bogged down in two wars and planning a third (with Iran), might move toward a confrontation with Russia. Yet that is what the White House appears to be doing. The August 11 Cleveland Plain Dealer reported that

President Bush called the violence unacceptable and Vice President Dick Cheney…said Russia’s actions in Georgia “must not go unanswered”…

Asked to explain Cheney’s comment, White House spokesman Gordon Johndroe said, “It means it must not stand.”

That phrase should send cold chills down the back of every American. It precisely echoes President George H.W. Bush’s statement in response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, a statement that led to war. The White House cannot be unaware of the parallel, which means it is threatening war with Russia.

Have these people gone utterly mad? It is doubtful we should risk nuclear war for Alabama, much less Georgia.

A few facts are in order here. First, the current conflict was started not by Russia but by Georgia, which foolishly attacked the Russian dependency of South Ossetia. Did Georgia make this suicidal move with prior assurance of American backing? If so, Washington provoked the conflict, which would be as great a crime as the Bush administration lying us into war with Iraq.

Second, Georgia clearly lies inside Russia’s sphere of influence and as far outside America’s as it is possible to get.

Third, there is nothing America can do to defend Georgia except threaten nuclear war. We could send in a small “tripwire” force of a battalion or two - God help us if we do - and dare the Russians to attack it. But if they called the bluff - and I think they would - what then? It is impossible for the United States to wage conventional war with Russia in her own backyard. We would have to go nuclear, or back down and accept defeat. It is all too easy to guess which alternative the Bush administration would select.

President Bush has used Georgia to taunt and humiliate Russia, even putting Georgia up for NATO membership, which the Europeans were wise enough to block. This folly was part of a larger strategic blunder, going back to the Clinton administration, of treating Russia as an opponent despite the fall of Communism.

That blunder is now blowing up in our face, as Russia in turn uses war with Georgia to teach America a lesson about the dangers of overextension and the price to be paid for humiliating a Great Power. Prudence suggests we swallow our medicine and profit by it, tempering our ambitions and our arrogance with a dose of reality.

But under the King of Misrule, folly remains the order of the day. The Bush White House tells itself American power knows no limits. All that is required is that they show sufficient “will,” and the rest of the world will buckle.

Not this time. Russia has taken all it is going to take.

It beggars the imagination to think that America could find itself in a nuclear confrontation with a post-Soviet Russia. But if the White House acts in accordance with its rhetoric, the next few weeks or even days may witness just such a strategic catastrophe.

William S. Lind, expressing his own personal opinion, is Director for the Center for Cultural Conservatism for the Free Congress Foundation.

To interview Mr. Lind, please contact (no e-mail available):

Mr. William S. Lind
Free Congress Foundation
1423 Powhatan Street, # 2
Alexandria, Virginia 22314
Direct line: 703 837-0483

Here’s the preface:

Why another hip-pocket guide for counterinsurgency? What makes this different? This handbook is an offering from a group of Marine officers who feel that current doctrine is rapidly diverging from the intent of maneuver doctrine. Where other manuals aim to put current conflicts into the Maoist/Nationalist mold of the Twentieth century and aim to identify successful techniques, this book seeks to bring about a change in approach and thinking which is timeless. In an age where war is no longer monopolized by armies but is waged by non-governmental entities, ethnic groups, tribes, federal agencies and militias, we find it necessary to look to parallels and successful thought processes in the inter-agency arena. This we may apply to the current and future conflicts of a 4GW nature. Our hope is to complement the FMFM-1A and provide a useful springboard of thoughts and practices.

Available from our 4GW Manuals page.

Please note that FMFM-1A is offered here in draft form. We (the seminar) welcome suggestions for changes and improvements. When the seminar reconvenes each fall, we will consider and evaluate any suggestions that we receive, although as the nature of Fourth Generation warfare has yet to reveal itself fully, we do not expect to produce a “final” version of the manual. Our goal is simply to continue to create a more comprehensive draft.

You can download it from our 4GW Manuals page.

As the neo-cons celebrate a “victory” in Iraq that has yet to be won, they also proclaim the downfall of Muqtada al-Sadr, leader of the Mahdi Army militia and staunch opponent of the American occupation.  The headline of the August 5 Wall Street Journal announced, “Radical Iraq Cleric in Retreat.”

Well, maybe.  But I think something else is happening to the Mahdi Army, and it is a development of more than passing interest to those concerned with 4GW theory.  I think Muqtada al-Sadr is attempting to transition from leading a 4GW, non-state entity, the Mahdi Army, to taking over a state.

Like all changes of horses in mid-stream, the operation is delicate and can easily go awry.  But Mr. Sadr so far seems to be making all the right moves.  As the Wall Street Journal piece reports,

Mr. Sadr began moving away from military operations when he ordered a cease-fire last August after Mahdj Army members clashed with government forces in the southern city of Karbala during a Shiite religious holiday.  The fighting represented growing rivalry between Sadr followers and supporters of the main Shiite parties in government … In February Mr. Sadr extended the cease-fire for an additional six months.

If Muqtada al-Sadr wants to rule Iraq, he cannot let himself and his organization be drawn into Shiite-on-Shiite violence.  That would narrow his base when he needs to broaden it, and would also alienate the large majority of Iraqis who want order and security, not more war.  The cease-fire and its extension were wise.

The Journal quotes from a new brochure issued by the Mahdi Army leadership that lays out Sadr’s next move:

(The) brochure … states that the Mahdi Army will now be guided by Shiite spirituality instead of anti-American militancy.  The group will focus on education, religion and social justice… The brochure also states that it “is not allowed to use arms at all.”

Here, the Mahdi Army is clearly taking a page out of Hezbollah’s book.  Hezbollah’s strength comes from its effectiveness and honesty in delivering services to the community that the state cannot provide.  The Journal quotes Kenneth Pollack of Brookings as saying, “If the government fails to deliver on basic services and other needs of the Iraqis, Sadr followers could use their new organization to tell people they should look to them as the voices of change.”  Precisely so.  This is a key element of the struggle for legitimacy, which Mr. Sadr seems to understand will be decisive in determining who controls post-occupation Iraq.

Mr. Sadr has promised that small, well-trained elements of the Mahdi Army will continue to attack the Americans, but so far he has held off launching such attacks.  That too is wise.  He can maintain his anti-American credentials, another key to legitimacy, with less risk by working politically for the Obama-al-Maliki plan, under which the American occupation troops would leave Iraq by 2010.  If I were in Sadr’s position, I would be organizing massive street demonstrations to demand withdrawal by 2010 be the basis of any new status of forces agreement with the Americans.  That is a win-win position.  If the Iraqi government demands American withdrawal on that timetable, Sadr can claim the credit, and if al-Maliki crumbles under American pressure and allows the occupation to continue indefinitely, al-Maliki loses his only chance to gain some legitimacy.

The Mahdi Army will retain its ability to go to war with the Americans if it has to.  But that capability is most useful as a “fleet in being,” maintained as a threat but not employed.  The threat gives Mr. Sadr more leverage than armed action would buy him, because the Mahdi Army is not strong enough to force the Americans out and it could suffer a military defeat. More, war with the Americans would bring more chaos and suffering to the Iraqi people, for which they might blame Sadr.

Sadr’s change of horses in mid-stream may of course fail.  His movement could come apart under the strain, as militant elements that want to fight the Americans split off.  His failure is not in America’s best interest, not only because it would mean more American casualties but also because it would undermine the chance for a new state to arise in Iraq.  I continue to think Muqtada al-Sadr represents that best available leader for a new Iraqi state, because only someone who has opposed the occupation can have legitimacy.  America only wins in Iraq if and when a new state emerges there, a real state, not a fig-leaf to cover the reality of continued American control.

From the standpoint of Fourth Generation War theory, the Mahdi Army’s attempt to move from its status as a 4GW, non-state entity to an organization that can create and control a new Iraqi state is a hopeful sign.  If it succeeds, other 4GW entities may be tempted to do the same.  That brings them back within the state framework, a positive development in terms of the interests of the international state system.  It is the success and continuation of that system that is America’s most vital interest in the face of Fourth Generation War.  Not all 4GW entities will take that track, nor would it be in their interest to do so.  But if even some can be drawn back into the framework of the state, the 4GW threat will diminish.  Washington will never see it this way, because Washington cannot think strategically.  But those who can should pray that Muqtada al-Sadr continues to make all the right moves.

William S. Lind, expressing his own personal opinion, is Director for the Center for Cultural Conservatism for the Free Congress Foundation.

To interview Mr. Lind, please contact (no e-mail available):

Mr. William S. Lind

Free Congress Foundation
1423 Powhatan Street, # 2
Alexandria, Virginia 22314

Direct line: 703 837-0483

WASHINGTON - U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has declined to formally endorse an interagency “white paper” on nuclear deterrence strategy, Global Security Newswire has learned (see GSN, July 25, 2007).

The roughly 30-page document, which has yet to be publicly released, is intended to expand on a four-page statement about nuclear weapons policy issued jointly in July 2007 by three Cabinet secretaries:  Rice, Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman.  The unclassified version of the new paper has been delayed several times but should be unveiled in the next few weeks, according to Bush administration officials.

The State Department was consulted on the white paper and supports its contents, but has stopped short of officially sponsoring it, Rice’s staff officially confirmed.  Aides said Rice opted to leave it to her defense and energy counterparts to issue the new document because it is more technical than last year’s statement, and thus lies outside her diplomatic purview.

The 2007 statement emphasized a need for a smaller, more modern U.S. nuclear arsenal in the face of increased capability among “rogue states” as well as weapons improvements by other “established nuclear powers.”

The three secretaries argued in favor of moving forward with the development of a new nuclear weapon, the Reliable Replacement Warhead.  Proponents say the weapon concept, which has drawn little support from the Democratic-controlled Congress, would offer gains in safety, security, reliability and maintainability, compared to today’s stockpile.

A classified version of the expanded report on “National Security and Nuclear Weapons: Maintaining Deterrence in the 21st century” was submitted to Congress in March, according to Thomas D’Agostino, head of the Energy Department’s semiautonomous National Nuclear Security Administration.

He said a declassified copy would soon follow.

“We’re working to be able to take out the classified sections and release an unclassified version because we are confident that it’s important to get as much information out in the public as possible,” D’Agostino told a House panel in early April.  “This administration is driven by Department of Defense [officials] and combatant commanders [who] believe that the effort to study replacement concepts is important to the long-term assurance of the stockpile.”

To date, neither D’Agostino nor any other government leader has publicly disclosed that the expanded paper was signed only by two of the three secretaries who issued last year’s statement.

The latest delay in the white paper’s planned debut by the Defense and Energy departments reportedly is due to State Department requests to alter some descriptions of potential nuclear adversaries.  Further details about these discussions could not be independently verified at press time.

However, a difference over report language is not the reason that State Department officials are citing for why Rice has declined to co-sponsor the white paper.

“The March 13, 2008, paper addresses technical issues for the Congress such as design, manufacturing, and operational status of the U.S. nuclear arsenal,” State Department officials said in a written response to questions.  ”These are properly the responsibilities of the departments of Defense and Energy.”

They added:  “Appropriate offices of the Department of State were consulted early in the paper’s preparation and the Department supports the paper’s conclusions.”

Yet, there might be more to Rice’s decision than meets the eye, according to some observers.

State Department leaders might prefer to avoid focusing on new warhead development as the United States seeks to rally global support for dismantling North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and a suspected developmental effort in Iran, said one former defense official involved in nuclear affairs.  An RRW supporter, the former official spoke on condition of anonymity.

Some RRW opponents have asserted that the United States might argue more successfully against global nuclear weapons proliferation if it set aside its own plans for stockpile modernization and focused instead on force reductions.

In signing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1968, the United States agreed with other declared nuclear-weapon nations to “achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament.”

Last year’s interagency statement turned that thinking on its head.

“Without assuming serious risk, further reductions in the total stockpile are only achievable with a responsive nuclear infrastructure,” stated the document, referring to RRW program objectives.

The three secretaries also declared that delays in producing the new warhead “raise the prospect of having to return to underground nuclear testing to certify existing weapons.”

The incoming leaders of the Joint Chiefs of Staff tempered these assertions a few days later.

Marine Corps Gen. James Cartwright, now the vice chairman, told a Senate committee that the proposed warhead would help facilitate stockpile reductions but was not necessary to begin such cuts.  Testifying alongside him, now-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Michael Mullen emphasized that the Stockpile Stewardship Program continues to allow the nation to avoid explosive nuclear weapon tests (see GSN, Aug. 1, 2007).

Still, administration leaders are expected to continue to argue in the new white paper that the United States must maintain a nuclear weapons stockpile numbering roughly 5,000 warheads into the foreseeable future, according to Jeffrey Lewis, director of the New America Foundation’s Nuclear Strategy and Nonproliferation Initiative.

While that figure represents just one-quarter of the warheads in the stockpile at the height of the Cold War, it remains far more than some critics believe is necessary to preserve nuclear deterrence against current and projected threats.

“At a time when the State Department is trying to get Russia and China to back tougher sanctions on Iran, explaining that we need several thousand nuclear weapons to keep parity with the Russians and overwhelm the Chinese is not helpful, to say the least,” Lewis said yesterday.  “If I were Secretary Rice, I would prefer those things be left unsaid.”

These issues are expected to be taken up again later this year.  A congressionally mandated bipartisan review commission on the U.S. strategic nuclear posture is set to report its recommendations by Dec. 1 (see GSN, March 20).  The panel is headed by former defense secretaries William Perry and James Schlesinger.

[Reprinted by permission of National Journal Group. This article may not be reproduced or redistributed, in part or in whole, without express permission of the publisher. Copyright 2007, National Journal Group. For more information and exclusive news, go to http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org or http://www.nationaljournal.com.]

Saddam is dead. Had he remained in power, we would likely still believe he had WMD.

I won’t remind you of the costs of this achievement.

]]> http://www.d-n-i.net/dni/2008/08/05/we-won-in-iraq/feed/ http://www.d-n-i.net/dni/2008/08/01/should-obama-escalate-the-war-in-afghanistan/ http://www.d-n-i.net/dni/2008/08/01/should-obama-escalate-the-war-in-afghanistan/#comments Fri, 01 Aug 2008 21:24:43 +0000 Chet http://www.d-n-i.net/dni/?p=226 Chuck Spinney voices his opinion on this subject, and proposes a thought experiment, in Counterpunch.

Here’s the premise:

At the heart of this question is the nature of the conflict in Afghanistan, specifically the question of whether or not it has mutated into something that is more akin to a classical guerrilla war as opposed to being part of a Fourth Generation War against al Quaeda. The two attachments below may help the reader to appreciate the different dimensions of this consideration.

Good luck with the experiment.

Senator John McCain’s position on the situation in Iraq is wrong on two counts, which means his criticism of Senator Obama is also wrong.  The twin pillars of McCain’s assessment of the war are a) the surge worked and b) because the surge worked we are now winning.  Neither of those views is based in fact.

The first represents the long-recognized logical fallacy known as post hoc ergo propter hoc, i.e., because one event occurred after another, it was a consequence of the first event.  Because the cock crows before sunrise, he thinks he makes the sun come up.  Because violence in Iraq dropped after the surge, McCain claims the surge caused the reduction in violence.  He is quick to add that he supported the surge at the time, which Obama did not.  In the real world, neither rooster nor Senator has quite so much reason to strut upon his dunghill.

The reduction in violence in Iraq, which is likely to prove temporary, has four causes, the least of which is the surge.

In order of importance, they are:

1. Al Qaeda’s alienation of much of its Sunni base, a consequence of its attempt to impose its Puritanical version of Islam before it won the war and consolidated power.  This is a common error of revolutionary movements.  The smart ones back off and take a “broad front” strategy until the war is won, at which point they cut their “moderate” allies’ throats.  Al Qaeda’s non-hierarchical structure, coupled with the message it employs to recruit, may prevent it from adopting a broad front strategy.  If so, that may prove a fatal weakness.
2. A change in policy by the U.S. Marines in Anbar Province whereby they stopped attacking the Sunni population and started paying it instead.  As the FMFM 1-A argues, in 4GW, cash is your most important supporting arm.  The Marines’ new policy, which has now spread to the U.S. Army and beyond Anbar, enabled the locals to turn on al Qaeda and its brutally enforced Puritanism.
3. General Petraeus’s decision to move U.S. troops off their FOB’s and into populated areas where they could protect the population instead of merely protecting themselves.
4. Last and least, the surge, which made more troops available for #3.  Absent the other three developments, the surge would have achieved nothing.

In his first assertion, Senator McCain is claiming credit where credit is not due.  In his second, that we are winning in Iraq, he fails to understand what “winning” means in a Fourth Generation conflict.

The current reduction in violence in Iraq does not mean we are winning.  Nor does al Qaeda’s incipient defeat mean we are winning.  We win only if a state re-emerges, the state we destroyed by our invasion.  A reduction in violence and the defeat of al Qaeda are necessary preconditions for the re-emergence of a  state, but they are not sufficient to ensure it.

A state will be re-established in Iraq only if and when authority comes from a person’s position in the state hierarchy, e.g., governor, minister, mayor, army or police commander, functionary, etc.  Services must also come from the state.  At present, as best as I can determine, this is happening seldom. If at all.  Rather, authority derives from non-state bases such as relationship to a tribe, clan or militia, and services are provided by the U.S. military, NGOs, and Iraqi militias or religious organizations.  An Iraqi who holds a nominal state office may have authority, but his authority is not a product of his state office.  A local Iraqi government may provide some services, but the government in Baghdad is seldom the source of the resources or authority to provide those services.

In fact, the relative peace now prevailing in Iraq is largely the product of deals the U.S. military has made with real non-state Iraqi authority figures.  These deals were both necessary and prudent, but they represent de facto acceptance of the reality that there is no state.

So McCain is wrong on both counts.  The fact that a Presidential candidate is fundamentally wrong on so important a subject as the war in Iraq is disturbing.   More disturbing is the nature of the errors.  Both represent carryovers of Bush administration practices.  The first, stating that the surge is the cause of reduced violence, represents the Bush White House’s cynical practice of assuming the American people are too stupid to understand anything even slightly complex.  The second, claiming we are winning the Iraq war, represents President Bush’s policy of making statements that are blatantly at odds with reality and figuring that if the truth catches up with them, it will do so too late to alter the course of events.  It was the latter practice that got us into the Iraq war in the first place.

Together, the twin pillars of McCain’s Iraq assessment, both built of sand, give substance to the Democrats’ charge that a McCain Presidency would represent a third term for George Bush.  They also raise the question of whether they are honest mistakes or, like the arguments the Bush White House used to sell the Iraq conflict, simply lies.  One would hate to think that McCain’s “straight talk” comes from a forked tongue, but the parallels with Bush administration practices are too obvious to overlook.

William S. Lind, expressing his own personal opinion, is Director for the Center for Cultural Conservatism for the Free Congress Foundation.

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Mr. William S. Lind

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