Oct.01.2008
2:11 pm
by dni
On War #276: War on Two Fronts, Without Railways
By William S. Lind
September 30, 2008
One way to look at the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is to see them as one war with two fronts. Germany fought two-front wars twice in the 20th century, and it was almost able to prevail because it had the advantage of interior lines. The German Army could quickly shift divisions and corps from the Eastern to the Western front or vice versa, using the superb German rail system. Unfortunately, the U.S. lacks the advantage of interior lines in its ongoing two-front war. No railways run from Baghdad to Kabul.
U.S. commanders in Afghanistan have reportedly requested an additional 10,000 troops. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates was recently quoted in the Washington Post as telling the Senate Armed Services Committee, “I believe we will be able to meet that commanders’ requirement, but in the spring and summer of 2009…we do not have the forces to send three additional brigades to Afghanistan at this point.”
The only source for additional troops for Afghanistan is Iraq. The September 2008 issue of Army magazine quotes Joint Chiefs Chairman Admiral Michael Mullen as saying, “I don’t have troops I can reach for, brigades I can reach, to send into Afghanistan until I have a reduced requirement in Iraq.”
Without railways running on interior lines, we cannot move three brigades from Iraq to Afghanistan this week, then move them back to Iraq again a few weeks later if the situation there demands them. That means any shift of forces requires long-term stability in Iraq. Neo-con voices in Washington are now claiming “victory” in Iraq, which, if it were true, would release American forces stationed there for redeployment. This appears to be what Secretary Gates is counting on when he says we should be able to meet commanders’ request for 10,000 more troops in Afghanistan next spring or summer.
But I fear this represents a falsely optimistic reading of the situation in Iraq. In my view, the current relative quiet in Iraq is merely a pause as the parties there regroup and reorient for the next phase of the war. Unless we have the good sense to get out of Iraq now, while the going is good, we will be stuck there when that next phase starts. We will not then be in a position to shift forces from Iraq to Afghanistan, because without interior lines, any such shift much be long-term.
While most of the stuff on the internet is junk, the junk pile does hold an occasional diamond. One such is a daily report called “NightWatch,” written by a retired DIA analyst, John McCreary. As quoted in the Washington Post’s “Tom Rick’s Inbox,” “NightWatch” for September 11, 2008 said that
The U.S., as the most powerful faction (in Iraq), imposed power sharing on the Kurds, the Arab Sunnis and the Arab Shiites…Power sharing is deceptive because it always features reduced violence. It looks like victory, but is not….
Power sharing can last a long time, but it is not a permanent condition and does not signify one faction’s triumph over the others. It is never an end state, but rather a transitional period during which the participants prepare for the next phase of the struggle….
Thus, power sharing is always a prelude to violence.
If the next phase of Iraq’s civil war breaks out before spring 2009, Secretary Gates’s promise of more troops for Afghanistan will go unfulfilled. Both the Army’s and the Marine Corps’ cupboards are bare. We will in effect face enemy offensives on both fronts simultaneously, with no reserves.
Even with the advantages of interior lines and excellent railways connecting both fronts, Germany was not able to deal with such a situation from the summer of 1944 onward. Lacking those advantages, our predicament will be worse. We will find ourselves face-to-face with failure both in Iraq and Afghanistan, with few if any options. If an attack on Iran has meanwhile brought that country into the war against us, we will face a third front. Events in Pakistan could create a fourth. It is the nature of long wars that they tend to spread.
Whoever the next President is, he is likely to find himself living in interesting times.
William S. Lind, expressing his own personal opinion, is Director for the Center for Cultural Conservatism for the Free Congress Foundation.
To interview Mr. Lind, please contact (no e-mail available):
Mr. William S. Lind
Free Congress Foundation
1423 Powhatan Street, # 2
Alexandria, Virginia 22314
Direct line: 703 837-0483
Filed in Global and Strategic Issues, Iraq and the Middle East, Organization and Personnel Managment, Readiness, Strategy and Force Employment, William S. Lind |
8 Responses to “On War #276: War on Two Fronts, Without Railways”
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Logistics is the economic aspect of war.
The US is broke otherwise the 300 sorties a day shuttle between Iraq and Afghanistan, which is the spec for the C-17/C-5 combo, would be a done deal.
The US cannot keep this limited occupation up whether there were enough force structure or logistics.
The impending bail out will be financed using ‘mefo’ bonds, printed by the federal reserve; exchanged for the toilet paper in banks’ lock boxes and then traded as collateral for cash the US/Weimar chequer has just injected.
Mefo bonds were use by Schact (Hitler’s version of Bernanke) to fund Nazi rearmament without going on the world market for cash.
Krupp and Fokker used the bonds to raise capital for the arms production.
When will the US need to invade someone with assets to monetarize the mefos?
Where is the US’ Alsace?
[CR: As far as I can tell, we're the first empire in the history of the world that's paying for the privilege.]
I was going to say that I’d have liked an explanation of why air, being so much more developed now than during the world wars (or perhaps just WWI; aviation history’s not my strong suit) can’t compensate for the lack of railroad lines between Iraq and Afghanistan.
I think the “two-front” analogy is useful, but perhaps risky in that it can confuse Americans into thinking there are such things as definitive fronts in Iraq and Afghanistan when they really need to be broken of that idea.
I think another thing to bear in mind is that WWII, being a 2GW, was much more costly in terms of manpower. This is not the case in Iraq and Afghanistan.
OTOH, there are proportionately *less* “blue force” combatants, so I could be out to lunch…
> Thus, power sharing is always a prelude to violence.
Really? There are no historical examples to the contrary?
No way to sublimate violence into the democratic electoral process?
jaylemeux,
Airlift is hugely expensive. The airlifters consume huge amounts of fuel, the supply and maintenance burdens are quite severe.
However, if the exchange of forces were “worth it” the air bridges would form.
Either there is more to lose from moving forces from Iraq than to gain in Afghanistan, which is to refute the reason for the “surge” or the the Air Force cannot sustain the airlift and the Army ought to cancel future combat system because the airlift theory does not hold.
One reason Air Force changed the KC 45 specs and trying to buy a super large tanker was to buy an airlifter, one which could not handle outsize cargo.
Beggars the concept of the air mobile brigade in any regime above one at a time and close to lots of fuel.
To followup on jaylemiux’s second point, what we have in both Iraq and Afghanistan is an occupation - much different from a “front” in the traditional usage, and much more expensive in terms of manpower.
Situation seems well in hand.
Saddam’s victims miss his rule
Reuters
Oct 12, 2008
“If someone like Saddam came back, I’d not only support him, I’d invite him to dinner. My uncle was killed in 1982 in the Dujail incident. Still, life then was a million times better than now,” said Saad Mukhlif, a Shi’ite
[CR: Quite believable.
For that matter, look how popular the Communist Party, not to mention Stalin, still is in Russia. And until very recently, I would have bet that Osama bin Laden would have won any fair election in Saudi Arabia. This may not be true today.]
[...] always curmudgeonly Bill Lind makes the point as follows: The only source for additional troops for Afghanistan is Iraq. The September 2008 issue of Army [...]