Defense and the National Interest

May.14.2008
11:09 am
by Chet

Clausewitz on Cohesion

“The Continued Existence of the State: The Clausewitzian Concept of Cohesion,” by seydlitz89 (189 KB PDF)

The second of two articles contrasting the views of Martin van Creveld and Carl von Clausewitz.

Author seydlitz89 continues where he left off “The Decline of Strategic Theory.” Whether you buy into his critique of van Creveld, there’s a lot of interesting stuff — Nietzsche, Weber, Hobbes, Polyani, plus seydlitz89’s own insights (just to name a few) — to add to your strategic tool box.

To refresh your memories, seydlitz89 is a former US military intelligence operations specialist and later ops officer (overt strategic Humint collection) who served in Berlin from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s in a civilian capacity. He lives in Portugal and works in education.

He provided this introduction:

I am besides being a convinced Clausewitzian, an admirer of John Boyd and his thought. Boyd, contrary to some who follow him, and has Chet Richards has pointed out, never rejected the basic premise that war is a continuation of politics by other means.

The subject of the actual connections and/or disconnections between John Boyd and Clausewitz will have to wait for a future paper.

Filed in 4GW - Articles |

50 Responses to “Clausewitz on Cohesion”

Dr_Vomacton 19 May 2008 at 7:39 pm 1

A thoughtful paper, Seydlitz. There’s much in there to chew over. I’ll try to marshal my cats—er…thoughts—and write something that resembles a coherent reply as soon as I get some thinking time. Hmm…She Who Must Be Obeyed is leaving town for a few days…so perhaps there is hope.
seydlitz89on 20 May 2008 at 7:09 pm 2

Dr Vomact-

Thanks for the kind words.

I would only add that I wish to thank Dr. Richards for the opportunity to post this paper on his website, and that the point I make in the paper as to Clausewitzian cohesion and the connection between tactics and strategy should be of particular interest to this school of strategic thought.

So, Dr Vomact, how do you see the concept of “the dying state” now?
Dr_Vomacton 22 May 2008 at 2:56 pm 3

Seydlitz, In lieu of a response to the “decline of the state” question—which I have not yet had time to ponder, I would like to ask you what may be a very naive question.
In your essays, you lament the “decline of strategic theory”, and you talk about the theories of Clausewitz and Max Weber at length; you explicitly profess to be a “convinced Clausewitzian”. My question is, as I said, quite naive: What kind of theory is this?
Philosophers have professed an astounding variety of what might justifiably be called “theories” about this and that, or everything in general. Such theories might be usefully classified in a variety of ways. For example, some philosophical theories are not empirically verifiable or falsifiable, such as Parmenides’ assertion that space and time are illusory. On the other hand, Democritus’ assertion that everything is composed of small, indivisible units is empirically testable (depending on how one reads Democritus, anyway).
In modern times, science has pretty much spread out and confined philosophical theories to the non-empirical realm. To be (very) brief about it, scientific theories postulate explanations for natural phenomena that are testable. Such theories can be used to make predictions, and the outcome of these predictions determines the truth (or, more subtly, the “explanatory power”) of the scientific theory in question.
As you might expect, there is a largish “gray area” that is not covered by the distinction I have drawn. For example, let us suppose that someone says “War is one of the tools of policy; it is part of a continuum that has diplomacy at its other extreme.” I don’t know if anyone has ever said anything like this, but supose that someone did. What kind of assertion is this? If this was part of a comprehensive “theory of war”, would it be empirically verifiable? Would it be testable? Would it be useful? If so, how? Furthermore, what are your criteria for a “strategic theory” in general, with regard to the above questions?
You may wonder why I’m asking this. The reason is that I am having a hard time connecting what you say about certain theories and the facts under discussion (or the facts I had thought were under discussion—such as “declining” states, and so forth
Dr_Vomacton 22 May 2008 at 7:56 pm 4

Ooops…I guess my boss walked by just as I was writing my comment. Looks like I left something out in my haste to hit “Submit”. I do abhor these distractions. Here is what I was probably thinking (I’ll never know for sure, darnit):

) with your theoretical remarks. I’m asking your help in making that connection. Do I have to understand Clausewitz in order to understand the decline of the State, or can I safely ignore him? What’s the connection between theory and fact in this case?
seydlitz89on 23 May 2008 at 6:01 pm 5

[CR: This is far too long for a comment. Ordinarily, I would just delete it, but it's an important and well-written comment. It could go as a post in its own right, but I want to leave the 2008 Boyd Conference near the top for a while.]

Dr Vomact-

The question of theory is basic, but also complicated which is why I didn’t address it at any length in the second paper, although I had intended to. My excuse was the Hew Strachan essay which addresses the definition of strategic theory well I think.

But, back to basics, and I would like to see the 4GW people address this as well, since I have yet to see it . . .

Theory can be scientific as in the natural sciences, which would apply in this case if one saw war as a science. That would also imply that war was unchanging in its basic nature and character/grammar which I think is obviously not the case. So scientific theory would not apply unless one saw war as simply “physics” or “kinetic”, destroying target sets as quickly as possible.

Theory could also be seen as “positivist” as in a recipe for success (as in full, unquestioned understanding of the subject matter), as in how to open/run a business in a capitalist economy. This is the unstable condition of modern economic/econometric theory imo. Certain dubious assumptions would be necessary and certain requirements met. This would see theory as a clear set of guidelines, “do this and avoid that”, and would also see theory and reality as very close, perhaps indistinguishable. I suppose we would include Marxist “dialectical materialism” here too, as well as its faddish successors, but you would have to ask William Lind about that. . .

That isn’t what I am talking about. Rather, what is considered theory in the traditional social sciences. Clausewitz sees strategic theory (refer to Strachan’s article again for a discussion of the link between strategy and strategic theory) as a way of critical analysis along with having a pedagogical function, that is in teaching the commander how to think about war. The goal is to create a system of flexible concepts (gleamed from intense historical study) which are able to model all wars (in terms of the general theory), or (more historically bound) which would be the specific art of war for a period of time. As in Ruppert Smith´s book, “The Utility of Force”.

The general theory concepts themselves are more the nature of abstract ideal types (following Max Weber here), but there is also a tension between Weber and Clausewitz in that Clausewitz predates modern social science, assumes that the concepts reflect an actual “essence” which Weber would deny. I find this tension actually an advantage since the existence of war as autonomous from policy/politics seems useful. Recall that for Weber the ideal types are not real at all, but only subjective “yardsticks” with which the “scientist” would measure reality.

In this way Clausewitz’s general theory is part of a larger methodology, something like a “language” that students of this theoretical system can use to communicate and evaluate each others arguments. In all as Prof. Herberg-Rothe has written the general theory is more the nature of a “puzzle” than a “model”.

So, to answer you final question,

“Do I have to understand Clausewitz in order to understand the decline of the State, or can I safely ignore him?”

The question is absurd from this perspective, since you are basing it on a positivist notion that the state, that is all states, everywhere, are in “decline”, or as van Creveld would put it, “dying”. My question would be where do you get this assumption? From those whose arguments mask subjective political interests? You need to ask more questions.

If you were to reformulate the question on the other hand, for instance, “how is it that the state has seemingly lost the monopoly of war making power”? I would say, from a Clausewitzian perspective that it is due to changes in the political relations between “communities” however defined, which would include corporate political players influencing the decisions of states for their own purposes.

Here´s a few of links. . .

Hew Stachan´s article. . .

http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~content=a790435549~db=all~order=page

The Social Science of Carl von Clausewitz

http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G1-143341207.html

Prof. David Kennedy´s Of War and Law. . . do a search for “Clausewitz” and find how he is fundamental to his argument. . .

http://press.princeton.edu/titles/8263.html
Maxon 23 May 2008 at 8:16 pm 6

“I would like to see the 4GW people address this as well, since I have yet to see it . ”

If, I understand you ?

It’s a generalisation at best, but I’d characterise 4GW not only as an evolving study, and very much in the same sense as astronomy and cosmology evolves.

But also and essentially warfare (”politics by other means”) but without
the sanctimony and formality, and to various degrees closer to fundamental essence of human nature and at, or near it’s best, and also worst.

So what branches of science could be brought to bear in that
study ? Use your own imagination.

It can be recognised, but defined, ? the best analogy in nature might be a virus. Moreover, ” it” assumes the shape, boundaries, complexity and nuance of each container it’s placed inside.
(Analogy to environment and circumstances.)

MaXimillian.
jaylemeuxon 23 May 2008 at 8:32 pm 7

seydlitz-
good comment.

[CR: Thanks jaylemeux -- I thought so too. But you all please, try to observe the policy. It makes life so much easier for me.]
seydlitz89on 24 May 2008 at 2:14 pm 8

Max-

“the sanctimony and formality, and to various degrees closer to fundamental essence of human nature and at, or near it’s best, and also worst”

“The continuation of politics by other means” is part of a much larger general theory, whereas I haven’t seen anyone on the 4GW side describe their concept of theory at all. . . which is what I was referring to. If you look at any of the recent books on Clausewitz, this subject is always treated in depth.

Rather what I see in regards to 4GW (and I have addressed this before to Fabius) is a group of hopelessly reified concepts, what you refer to as the “fundamental essence of human nature” I suppose, which sounds very Marxist to me, sorry. What exactly would that be, and how is it theory and not a subjective worldview being sold as “reality”, in other words a reified concept?

Personally, I don’t think the natural sciences have much place in strategic theory, rather it is a social science where quite different rules apply. As to “virus” I would be careful in my selection of metaphors since we are dealing in warfare with a human opponent, not a cold.
seydlitz89on 24 May 2008 at 2:16 pm 9

Chet- Thanks for not deleting my long comment. I thought about dividing it in two, would that be the best solution, short of starting a new thread?

[CR: Seydlitz89 -- no, that really doesn't help. If you have more than a comment, and you piece was certainly more than a comment in both length and substance, it should be a post of its own.]
Maxon 24 May 2008 at 7:54 pm 10

“I haven’t seen anyone on the 4GW side describe their concept of theory at all. . .”

Those of us who have experienced it know it.

“Personally, I don’t think the natural sciences have much place in strategic theory, rather it is a social science where quite different rules apply. As to “virus” I would be careful in my selection of metaphors since we are dealing in warfare with a human opponent, not a cold.”

Appolgies, I dumbed it down too far.

Malignancy might be a better suited metaphor is some instances.

Keep working at it, and keep up the good work.

MaX
Cheton 25 May 2008 at 6:08 am 11

seydlitz89 –

Personally, I don’t think the natural sciences have much place in strategic theory, rather it is a social science where quite different rules apply.

This is a curious statement from a “Clausewitzian.”
Maxon 25 May 2008 at 7:54 am 12

CR;

“This is a curious statement from a “Clausewitzian.”

It’s certianly NOT snowmobiles being built on this thread.

MaX
seydlitz89on 25 May 2008 at 1:47 pm 13

Max-

If you’re talking from personal experience with the “reality” of 4GW then we are talking about a reified concept imo, and William Lind would very much agree with you. I would be careful with the labels one uses since this particular one comes with a lot of baggage. . . As in a very questionable view of history, various dubious assumptions concerning the state, and a strange connection/basis on van Creveld´s polemics. What is it exactly that makes Afghanistan a 4GW war and not a classic insurgency? The insurgent leaders in question were the former government, were they not, so how can they be against the legitimacy of the state in general or part of the deterministic “dying of the state” if their goal is the re-establishment of the Taliban state?

Ditto with Hizbullah in Lebanon which has to be classified as a “tribe” since its function as a political organization representing a specific political community and having more legitimacy in the eyes of many Lebanese than the nominal government, doesn’t compute in 4GW speak . . .

Nor can we consider the roles of actual states in either conflict, since they afterall are “dying” and could have no connection with “non-state” bodies since that would call their whole “non-state” status into question?
seydlitz89on 25 May 2008 at 2:00 pm 14

Chet-

“This is a curious statement from a “Clausewitzian.””

Not really, since as Clausewitz writes,

“War is an act of Human Intercourse
We therefore conclude that war does not belong in the realm of arts and sciences, rather it is part of man’s social existance. War is a clash between major interests, which is resolved by bloodshed - that is the only way in which it differs from other conflicts. Rather than comparing it to art we could more accurately compare it to commerce, which is also a conflict of human interests and activities; and is it is still closer to politics, which in turn may be considered as a kind of commerce on a larger scale. Politics, moreover, is the womb in which war developes - where its outlines already exist in their hidden rudimentary form, like characteristics of living creatures in their embryos.” Bk 2, Ch 3, OW

The best treatment imo of this view of theory forming the basis for methodology in the social sciences is in Max Weber’s essay, The ‘Objectivity of Knowledge’, in “The Essential Weber”, pp 383-404.

[CR: Max anticipated my response: What type of snowmobile would On War be without the concepts and analogies borrowed from the physical sciences?

Echevarria* gives some indication:

The center of gravity has become one of today’s most popular military concepts despite the fact that its origins extend back to the early industrial-age. First introduced by the Prussian military theorist, Carl von Clausewitz, in the late 1820s, the idea now appears in the doctrinal literature of all U.S. military services, and in many European militaries as well. (1)

Echevarria also notes how deeply the concepts from the physical sciences enriched Clausewitz’s work:

The quintessential cerebral savage, Clausewitz borrowed a number of intellectual constructs, theories, and concepts from the leading philosophers, scientists, and other thinkers of his day in order both to understand and to describe the various aspects of war that he observed. Several of his concepts—friction, polarity, and center of gravity—are analogies or metaphors drawn from the mechanical sciences. In particular, the original German text of Vom Kriege (On War) reveals that Clausewitz used the term CoG—expressed primarily as Schwerpunkt—more than 50 times, though not all of them refer to the military concept. (6)

I don’t know what “polarity” he is referring to, but one could certainly add one of the earliest mentions of complexity in western military thought, the “three magnet” phenomenon. It is because Clausewitz put in the effort to understand the sciences of his day that On War is still so widely cited by military professionals, while most of the rest of the strategic literature of that era languishes as footnotes in the odd Ph.D. dissertation.

* Echevarria, A. J. (2002). Clausewitz’s Center Of Gravity: Changing Our Warfighting Doctrine—Again! Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute. ]
seydlitz89on 25 May 2008 at 4:04 pm 15

Correction: Should be “The ‘Objectivity’ of Knowledge” . . . worth a careful read imo . . .
jaylemeuxon 25 May 2008 at 5:54 pm 16

seydlitz-
have you checked out Col. Hammes’ take on 4GW? i think his version isn’t so dependent on the decline of the state.
Maxon 26 May 2008 at 12:11 pm 17

“What is it exactly that makes Afghanistan a 4GW war and not a classic insurgency? ”

Sit down and think carefully about the Afgan campain, now into,
what ? The 6th year ?

The combined resourches of the western industrialsed world,
so 21st centrury resourches, against 19th century tribemen, some litterally cavemen, who have little or no techonolgy at thier disposal, no TV networks, no military industrial complex, aireal refueling,
stealth, sattelites, etc, etc.

And yet the best we can manage is a stalemate.

Thier power, and it’s considerable, in the context of that
enviroment comes from a extream religious doctrine, and
threats and intimidation within the population, and on the
personel level.

In that sense they have far more in common with organised crime, and urban gangs, than anything else,
which Lind has argued (successfully in my mind) is and falls
under the catagory of manifistations of 4GW.

M
seydlitz89on 27 May 2008 at 4:08 am 18

Chet-

“What type of snowmobile would On War be without the concepts and analogies borrowed from the physical sciences?”

But the Schwerpunkt is not on the natural sciences, rather on politics and human relations. It is from that perspective that everything else must be seen. The analogies and metaphors borrowed from the natural science of Clausewitz’s day - including friction and non-linearity - are important but are all primarily about human relations, the interaction of two opposing political/social wills. For this audience, I can’t emphasize this enough, which is why I started my statement with “Personally” . . . I’m talking about the nature of theory here, not denying that Clausewitz took some analogies or metaphors from physical science - such as the flow of water - to illustrate his concepts.

Rather in this regard, the natural sciences are seen as exactly not the way to go in regards to the nature of theory which is what is for me the subject of this thread. Given that van Creveld’s influence on 4GW is so great and it has yet to be demonstrated how political purpose (especially in regards to the state) fits in with the whole 4GW theory at all or how it can given the “dying state” since with the end of the state is also the end of politics, actually of democracy . . .

As to “not building snowmobiles”, well that would be praxis, would it not?, whereas what I talking about here would be what comes before that, as in defining what a snowmobile is and formulating the process of construction in an abstract way, that is theory. Although “building snowmobilies”, an industrial construction process, would not be the analogy I would use.

I just get the impression that ya’ll haven’t really thought much about exactly what type of theory we are dealing with here . . .
Maxon 27 May 2008 at 6:45 am 19

“building snowmobilies”, an industrial construction process, would not be the analogy I would use.

BTW; Have you read or studied anything at all on Boyd, the LWF Mafia
or the Military reform movement ?

Just curious ?

MaX
seydlitz89on 27 May 2008 at 8:20 am 20

Jaylemeux-

I think Hammes says some interesting things in “The Sling and the Stone”. As to his views of van Creveld’s “dying state” he’s ambiguous, (does he buy into it or not?) since all he says is “Van Creveld clearly sees warfare as evolving with the political, social, and economic structures of the time” (p12). Clausewitz would agree with this statement as well. Later however, he says something rather questionable on page 73 which attempts to link the loss of the Vietnam war with the influence of Clausewitz, but it was only after the Vietnam war that Clausewitz gained much real notice in US military education. Contrary to Hammes, what caused the lack of strategic insight in regards to the Vietnam war was an emphasis on “systems management” and “operations analysis”, or as LtGen Paul K van Riper wrote in his excellent essay, “The Relevance of History to the military profession”, “the resulting undo emphasis on the science of war”. Riper, not surprisingly, praises Clausewitz, which brings us back to how we define “theory” . . .

For another critical view of Hammes, you could go to Echevarria, who writes:

“Some 4GW proponents, such as Colonel Thomas Hammes, author of The Sling and the Stone, see the theory as little more than a vehicle, a tool, to generate a vital dialogue aimed at correcting deficiencies in U.S. military doctrine, training, and organization.
For his part, Hammes is to be commended for his willingness to roll up his sleeves and do the hard work necessary to promote positive change. However, the tool that he employs undermines his credibility. In fact, the theory of 4GW only undermines the credibility of anyone who employs it in the hope of inspiring positive change. . .”

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/Pubs/display.cfm?pubID=632
Cheton 27 May 2008 at 7:15 pm 21

Unfortunately Dr. Echevarria’s critique of 4GW is marred by his lack of understanding of the subject:

Moreover, the types of high-technology that 4GW’s proponents envisioned terrorists using includes such Wunderwaffe as directed energy weapons and robotics, rather than the cell phones and internet that terrorists actually use today. 4GW theorists also failed to account for the fact that many 21st century wars, such as those that unfolded in Rwanda and the Sudan, would be characterized by wholesale butchery with “old-fashioned” weapons such as assault rifles and machetes wreaking a terrible toll in lives. Even in the so-called information age, the use of brute force remains an effective tactic in many parts of the world. (pp. 4-5)

Compare to what 4GW theorists actually write, as in FMFM-1A, Fourth Generation Warfare, which for my taste goes too far in Echevarria’s direction. Other than that, and his confusion of 4GW with “terrorism” and maneuver with “movement,” it’s not bad.
Maxon 28 May 2008 at 9:20 am 22

Rwanda is a most interesting case and example.

In as much as I recognise 4GW as involving non state entities,
it also follows the attributes of what I’d characterise as full spectrum
warfare, and with the tools at hand.

In Rwanda, an important 4GW distinction was in the use
of tools at hand, and particularly that included the now infamous main RADIO station, which sent out, and spread the infamous message to begin the slaughter.

Without that, it might never have happened.

A civil war of the 4th generation ?

http://tinyurl.com/43fan
http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/dallaire/

MaX
Dr_Vomacton 28 May 2008 at 3:23 pm 23

Thank you for your thoughtful responses, Seydlitz. I think I’m beginning to get your general drift. I have not had the time to do you the courtesy of a properly thought-out reply, so I’m afraid that another informal note will have to do for now…maybe forever.
Martin van Creveld’s Transformation of War and his other writings (e.g. the essay “Through A Glass, Darkly”) caught my attention because I believed (and still believe) that he has made some very astute observations about recent history and current geopolitical developments. If felt that reading vC gave me a better grip on understanding what is going on.
The problem with vC is that he is not a particularly subtle theorist, and it is a mistake to read him as though he were. He himself invites such criticism by making overly grandiose claims—especially in connection with “the State” (I’ve always found “1648″ to be somewhat comical, like a secret handshake among the cognoscenti) and about the theory of war (by devaluing Clausewitz).

I want to thank you for making this clear to me: to talk about the “decline of the European Nations” is not the same as talking about “the decline of the State”. It is the first that is happening, not necessarily the second. It is the first that vC has observed, and has mistakenly conflated with the second. (The U.S. is, of course, by history and culture a European nation…today, at any rate.)
As you also point out, the decline of the “West” does not necessarily imply global collapse: other States may rise as we decline. In fact…they are.
Van Creveld is correct, I think, about the new limitations imposed on war by nuclear weapons. He exaggerates their role in the “decline of the (European) state” because he underestimates the material and moral exhaustion of the European states consequent to the World Wars as a factor in their decline. He is also correct about other things: for example the moral aspect of war, the observation that when the strong fight the weak, they lose the moral high ground.
As for so-called “Fourth Generation War”, I agree that it does not constitute a theory of warfare in any serious sense. At it’s best, it’s more like a rule of thumb: something to get people thinking about different ways of fighting, a way of saying, “the age of major inter-state wars is over—deal with it”.

I believe that there’s a large gap between our interests. You are far more concerned with theoretical distinctions than I. By this, I do most certainly not mean that theory isn’t important, merely that I am not very interested in socio-political theories at this moment. However, I seem to be learning something from you…so perhaps my disinterest is merely disguised laziness. You’re certainly helping me think more critically about van Creveld, though I still maintain that his observations are of considerable value.
jaylemeuxon 28 May 2008 at 4:18 pm 24

“Moreover, the types of high-technology that 4GW’s proponents envisioned terrorists using includes such Wunderwaffe as directed energy weapons and robotics, rather than the cell phones and internet that terrorists actually use today.”

-What, did he get this from the 1989 Gazette article? That’s sloppy.

Seydlitz-

I wasn’t implying that Hammes’ book is without error, and I’d question the assertion that any book worth reading is. I was just trying to illustrate that the concept of 4GW is not limited to Lind/Creveld’s ideas and that there is some internal debate about what it is. Does that make it too loosely understood to be a theory as defined by social science? Maybe, but what difference does that make?
Maxon 28 May 2008 at 6:32 pm 25

Dr. V.

“He is also correct about other things: for example the moral aspect of war, the observation that when the strong fight the weak, they lose the moral high ground.”

Perhaps it goes without saying, but ‘they’ lose only when they do not
confront and deal with the opponent on the same scale and proportion.

And as we clearly see, the western interests, principly the USA,
and also Isreali’s under pressure from their own military, refuses to dispense with the high tech weaponry and specificaly the reletively heavy handed indescriminate use of overwhelming force.

The sloagan for the F-22 fighter although tracticaly unrelated, epitomises the overall and pervasive mindest

“in the design and deployment of the F-22 we don’t want a fair fight.”

Nobody in the west is willing to accept the losses and sacrifices associated with the face to face type of conflict that the Russians and Germans engaded in in Leningrad. And the 4th generational opposition recognise that, and exploit that to no end, tacticaly, and in the battle for hearts and minds.

Furthermore when 4th generational opposition and by deifinition
then resorts to the most hainous tactics, we cry foul, metaphoricaly from a reletively safe and comfortable perch at 40,000ft, and mach 2,
lobbing socalled smart weapons, that frequently miss target.

Even worse now with the increasing reliance on UAVs
and the like.

Like it or not, (and you won’t) when things go wrong as they invariably do in warfare, This gets perceived by opposition, neutrals,
and even among allies as a variation of abject cowardance.
In as much as we percieve the reciprocal terrorisim.

As for the all rest, I’m not buying, until I think it over.

Thanks DV for rescueing this thread.
It’s all good.

MaXimillian
jaylemeuxon 28 May 2008 at 9:29 pm 26

“Perhaps it goes without saying, but ‘they’ lose only when they do not
confront and deal with the opponent on the same scale and proportion.”

Max-
I don’t know if dealing with it on the same scale and proportion is even enough. Everybody in the world knows that, whatever discretion we exercise, we still have more resources at hand than they do.
Maxon 29 May 2008 at 10:29 am 27

jaylemeux

I tend to agree, in as much as the die has been cast.

We coulda, shoulda, woulda, gone into Afganistan
only, with smaller teams of crack special forces, captured
Bin Laden, dead or preferably alive, and put him on trial
in the Hauge.

That’s all, full stop, pass go, and collect $ 200.00

It’s all coming out now, with the rats jumping ship.
Predictable, and so pathetic, you’d lose interest
if this was a hollywood plot. It’s not though.

And look what it’s done to our once proud country,
and well within living memory of Richard Nixon, Vietnam,
the previous oil crisis, and all THAT 1968 - 1974 similarly
greviously costly excursion into collective insanity.

http://news.yahoo.com/s/politico/20080529/pl_politico/10681

McClellan: WH wanted him to stay silent

Mike Allen 2 hours, 35 minutes ago

Former White House press secretary Scott McClellan, speaking out for the first time since publication of his searing memoir, told NBC’s “Today” show on Thursday that he erroneously believed what President Bush was saying about the war but now is answering to a higher loyalty: “a loyalty to the truth.”
SNIP
Dr_Vomacton 29 May 2008 at 2:40 pm 28

I don’t know if dealing with it on the same scale and proportion is even enough. Everybody in the world knows that, whatever discretion we exercise, we still have more resources at hand than they do.

Perhaps you’re right; when he praises the British performance in Northern Ireland, Van Creveld said that they deliberately “made themselves weak”. He claims that overall, they took more casualties than their opponents. This Christ-like turning of the other cheek sounds foolish in this world…but there is strength in such foolishness.
As for everyone knowing that we are “really” strong, I don’t think that matters. After all, it’s no special achievement when the weak act with restraint; for the strong to do so…that is virtue—and perceived as such.
One incident I remember with great clarity from my days in the Berkeley wars is this: a line of policemen were standing in front of a building to protect it (we had planned to seize it for some sinister purpose that I can’t seem recall). These men had obviously been summoned in haste—they didn’t have the usual protective riot gear. The crowd started to throw stones and bottles, but the police did not react. They just stood there, and took it. One officer went down, and was dragged to safety inside the building by his comrades. Then a second was hit in the face with a rock, and he too had to be carried inside.

Now, I may have been a young fool, but I recognized courage when I saw it. These guys had guns, but they weren’t shooting. So I turned around and left…and noticed that many others were doing the same thing.

If all the police at Berkeley had been so wisely led and so brave, the “troubles” would have been fewer and much shorter. We rebels would have been shamed into taking our own “peace” rhetoric seriously.

Actually, they did somewhat catch on in 1969. Someone realized that the big attraction for rebels is a good fight with the forces of Order…so they just boycotted our riots. About 10,000 people would be milling around Sproul Plaza, waiting for the cops to line up and do their usual tear gas and baton charge thing…and nothing would happen. Boooring. Nothing to do but go to class.
seydlitz89on 29 May 2008 at 4:37 pm 29

jaylemeux-

“Does that make it too loosely understood to be a theory as defined by social science? Maybe, but what difference does that make?”

Good question, in fact why do we need strategic theory at all . . .?

We could do just fine with just praxis, or simply doing without any theoretical background at all, which would be simply “building snowmobiles” as the local “inside baseball” view has it. Well yes, but we are talking about a rather complex activity which is fighting wars . . . which is actually becoming only more complex . . . not that any of us are doing any fighting.

Still, Clausewitz recognizes the “military genius” who is able to function without strategic theory, acts pretty much according to instinct . . . which is a definition of “genius”. So when was the last time we had such a genius? In the 20th Century. . . and I’ve thought about this all day . . . Trotski. A man with little military training, which would include theory of course, who commanded armies and made strategy.

Can anyone think of anyone else?

My next post will be the advantage of having strategic theory as a social science . . .
seydlitz89on 29 May 2008 at 5:05 pm 30

But first we should do a strategic theory quiz . . .

Listen to the two speakers. Which one is dealing with the war situation in Iraq “as a whole”?

William Odom?

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j8DPV-qDKcQ

or Thomas Hammes?

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xM4wkcQEgdo

Strategic theory is all about being able to tell the difference between the two . . .
Dr_Vomacton 29 May 2008 at 9:30 pm 31

I’d say Odom is the strategist, Hammes the tactician. Do I pass?

As I was listening to Odom, it occurred to me to wonder why it is that generals seem to get so much smarter after they retire. Odom addressed this, I think—he said something about serving officers having to follow the official policy line. But does such an obligation really exist? Or would we be better off if our generals understood that they are not only allowed to speak out if their orders are stupid or evil, but that they have the duty to do so?

Unless we require generals to speak their minds before they retire, we aren’t getting our money’s worth. While colonels might concern themselves only with tactics, no one should rise to the rank of general without having strategic competence, and the willingness to exercise that competence. Generals should be expected to decide strategy…and be held accountable by their subordinates and the people if they are wrong. “I was just following orders” might be an excuse for a private, but it’s wholly unacceptable from a general officer.
Dr_Vomacton 29 May 2008 at 9:44 pm 32

We coulda, shoulda, woulda, gone into Afganistan
only, with smaller teams of crack special forces, captured
Bin Laden, dead or preferably alive, and put him on trial
in the Hauge.

I have to disagree with you on that one, Max. I think we should have kicked butt big-time in Afghanistan, not hired a bunch of local extras to play-act a war for us. It’s the principle of the thing, you see…here we had a government who was openly giving shelter to our bloody-handed enemies. A point needed to be made: any government that shelters such people will not survive. It should have been quick, bloody—and over quickly.

Ironically, we acted through intermediaries when we brought down the Taliban because the politicians feared incurring American casualties. Because of this misplaced tenderness, we’re now involved in two wars that are bleeding us both physically and morally, with an ever-mounting body-count. Had we done a quick cauterization of Kabul, the whole world would have understood: our friends would have supported us, and our enemies scurried for the nearest dark corner.
Dr_Vomacton 29 May 2008 at 9:58 pm 33

Still, Clausewitz recognizes the “military genius” who is able to function without strategic theory, acts pretty much according to instinct . . . which is a definition of “genius”. So when was the last time we had such a genius? In the 20th Century. . .

I’m not sure what you mean by “functions without theory”. Are you sure Trotski didn’t have some theories? How about Mao Tse Tung? Mao developed some pretty detailed ideas about strategy; does that disqualify him from being a genius? And then there’s Võ Nguyên Giáp. He also originated some theories about fighting. Another non-genius?

I think I have a problem with your definition of “genius” as “someone who acts by instinct”. Aside from my bafflement about what “instinct” means in this instance, I’m strongly inclined to say that someone who performs great military feats, such as conquering China or defeating two of the World’s Great Powers (France only barely qualified, I realize) is a genius—even if he debases himself by writing works of strategic theory.

I’m sure I’m misunderstanding you…time to stop punishing this keyboard.
Maxon 30 May 2008 at 7:56 am 34

“Perhaps you’re right; when he praises the British performance in Northern Ireland, Van Creveld said that they deliberately “made themselves weak”. He claims that overall, they took more casualties than their opponents.”

Amoung the worlds traditional trouble spots, N. Ireland has turned into a very pleasant success story, S. Africa looked
to be doing well after the truth, but has more recently back slided
into violence and strife.

M
Maxon 30 May 2008 at 8:40 am 35

I think we should have kicked butt big-time in Afghanistan, not hired a bunch of local extras to play-act a war for us. It’s the principle of the thing, you see…here we had a government who was openly giving shelter to our bloody-handed enemies.

Very interesting, we’re seeing the folly of that stratigy, as most of that is pretty much what we’ve done.

You’d need to attack and occupy, Iran, and Pakistan,
and with the reality of the volitility of that region including
nukes, its’ not an option, unless you really want
to start WW-3.

As you well know, no occuping force has ever prevailed in Afganistan
in recorded history.

The Taliban temproarily displaced, threatens to return the moment
we leave, and in that sense behave as a partiucuarly stubborn insect infestation, which we tried to defeat with smart bombs.

Meanwhile our local Clauswitz expert has far better descriptions.

The Tailban was in charge because it’s their country and that’s
the way they like it.

Same for Cuba, same for N’ Korea, Myranmar, etc,, etc, where
is it written western forces must intervein ?

A situation like 9-11 arises, and so, what ?! Just deal with it, catch and punish those responsible. Period.

Where do you come up with this ’sworn enemies’ knotion !?

The pepole of Afganistan, who put the Taliban in charge ?

We’re talking about gang of criminals, Alquida, That’s all.

Consider the case of the Oklahoma City bombing.

The US did not bomb, invade, occupy, destroy the infrastucture and hang the Governors of Utah, or N. Dakota.

It’s all BS as far as I’m concerned.

As for the all rest, in a sense we’re getting precisiely what WE deserve.

MaX
seydlitz89on 30 May 2008 at 9:01 am 36

Dr_Vomact-

My comments as to praxis and theory were in response to Jay’s question which I found very interesting and very much to the heart of the matter. To paraphrase, “What is the use of strategic theory?”

To answer that two responses:

One, the thought experiment of imagining a commander operating totally based on their own “instinct” without any basis of theory at all. This is very much an “ideal type”, not something that exists in the real world, but is a conceptual construct made for comparative purposes. This commander who operates totally by praxis would be the Clausewitzian “genius” being able to function without recourse to theory. I chose Trotski as the best example of this “non-theory using genius” since he was Lenin’s rival prior to 1917 and was a journalist, so probably didn’t have much exposure to theory (via Lenin’s writings on Clausewitz) or Clausewitz directly, or any other military theorist of that time. Thus Trotski would be the best example of a successful military commander operating according to praxis imo. Mao wouldn’t fit here since he was very interesting in theory, had read both Lenin and Clausewitz, wrote theory himself . . . Trotski wrote theory as well of course, but after the fact, kinda like Napoleon writing his memoirs. . .

My second approach was the “quiz”. Sorry for using that term, but the word got the idea across quickly enough and it was late, I had to get to bed. . . European time ya know. As to your response: Yes, very much the distinction between strategy and tactics, but then strategy would necessarily have to deal with both from this perspective, whereas tactics need not (obviously) from Hammes’s perspective. Still from my perspective, Hammes’s approach is dysfunctional, actually could be seen as a mask for political interests that he would rather not address. Odom on the other hand has no problem addressing those interests. . . Both men are retired btw.
Maxon 31 May 2008 at 4:02 am 37

“Ironically, we acted through intermediaries when we brought down the Taliban because the politicians feared incurring American casualties.

I strongly recommend, and encourage you read “Sorrows Of Empire”
by Chalmers Johnson. You’d benefit a lot from the experience, and
would find it most stimulating.

http://tinyurl.com/5fjw3q
http://hnn.us/articles/3015.html

I found it to be a real eye opener, and not unlike yourself considered myself reasonably enlightened and developed with a critical eye
Just and healthy cinisisim.

I had no idea, none what-so-ever.

The radical Islamic elements that settled in Afganistan
and evolved into the vaulted Taliban,
were actually recruited, nutured and fostered by the US, as
a vehicle to fight the Soviet occupation.

In that sense and as-per derigure in American military and clandestine
policy, yet again, we were ans continue to be masters of our own folly.

But to digress, and getting back to the theme of this thread, There is no such thing as 4th generational warfare, moreover there are no Witches, either.

MaX
seydlitz89on 01 Jun 2008 at 2:15 pm 38

Dr_Volmact-

Thanks for the kind words concerning my paper and whatever you may of gleened from my comments. This is perhaps the best compliment one thinking man can give another, and I don’t take such things lightly. I think we would both profit from your view of my paper. My goals here are simple: Get the paper on Clausewitzian cohesion out, maybe create a dialogue, maybe get people to question a few assumptions . . . These dialogues are important since I learn a lot as well, as I think we all can. Just the act of having to put one’s ideas down in words is very useful. As I’ve mentioned before I’m not here to “win” or have everyone agree with me, rather to learn.

I would not call vC a theorist at all, but a historicist. One could see the whole 4GW theory versus vC (as in why he keeps his distance) as the late 20th Century version of the “Methodenstreit” replayed. His writing prior to 1991 was excellent in my opinion before he turned to something else. As to the influence of nuclear weapons post-1945, that could also be seen from the Clausewitzian perspective of meaning an end to war as pursuing a rational political purpose between such armed states since their use, almost identitical with the concept of “absolute war”, precludes the achievement of a political purpose through the instrument of war. Thus no wars between nuclear-armed powers since it is not in their interest to do so, since the destruction caused would in no way be equal to the political purpose to be achieved, which of course is contrary to vC’s whole argument, but explains the situation better imo.

Once again, a good historian, but not really a theorist, since his break with Clausewitz (in 1991, whereas before that he was a Clausewitzian) is really a break with theory as opposed to historical, or the historian’s, interpretation imo.. I would compare/contrast him to another author, Alain Joxe, and his book, “Empire of Disorder” which is worth a read.

MaX-

I agree with just about everything you say, except when you link it with “4GW”.
Dr_Vomacton 01 Jun 2008 at 11:30 pm 39

Max, if we’re going to disagree, let’s be clear just how we disagree. First, I think a reaction against the Afghan government was appropriate because they had refused to yield up Osama Bin Laden for judicial proceedings in the matter of 9-11. It is my understanding that the U.S. government had evidence against Mr. Bin Laden, and had made a formal request of the Afghan government to extradite him, which that government refused. Given those facts, I believe a strong argument can be made that Afghanistan was complicit in an act of war against the United States. It would, therefore, have been just and also conformant with international law for the United States to respond in a warlike manner. I take it that you disagree with this. Perhaps you disagree with my premises—perhaps you think the government lied to us. Regrettably, I have to say that’s possible. But do you disagree with my conclusion that the use of force was justified in this instance?

I said nothing about “occupying” Afghanistan…goodness, why would anyone want it? Besides, Lord Elphinstone did such a magnificent job! I am merely saying that here was a case where force was justified (assuming my government told me the truth). However, I am not talking about the type of force required to “occupy” a country the size of Afghanistan, nor am I talking about a military/humanitarian effort to win “Afghan freedom”, or to better the lot of Afghan women. No, I am talking about a simple, old-fashioned punitive expedition.

What should have been the goals of the Afghan Punitive Expedition? Well, arrest key members of Bin Laden’s circle and of the current Afghan government on war crimes charges, and put them on trial in an appropriate venue (I’m thinking Switzerland, not Guantanamo). I rather expect that this would not have been easy, and that, sadly, certain people just wouldn’t want to be taken alive. However, if it was not possible, then I have to ask why we are paying taxes at all. If our military could not do this, why do we have a military?

As we know, the U.S. government did respond, but I feel that this response was both ineffective and heavy-handed. Most saliently, the Afghan action was (and is) marked by a complete befuddlement concerning our war aims, and by unrealistic expectations of what force can—and should—achieve. As a result, we are still mired in that inconsequential country.

If we’re going to talk about military reform, the failure of the Afghan Punitive Expedition might be a good place to start. Why can’t our military perform such a relatively simple task? And why do our generals agree to perform tasks that are ill-defined, or clearly beyond their capabilities? Someone must explain the utility and limits of force to the politicians…as I’ve said before, I think that’s the military’s job. A general can’t make war on his own…but he can say “no”.
Maxon 02 Jun 2008 at 9:52 am 40

“I believe a strong argument can be made that Afghanistan was complicit in an act of war against the United States.

Where I find the difficulty, and this goes well behond the limits
d constraints of the current basis of this discourse.

I’ve kicked this around for years, and coming full circle many times,
feeling exactly as you did, in justification for the invasion, and the dis-position of the Taliban.

All Fair enough, and I agree in as much as “Something “had to be done.

It’s comes down to the ongoing
occupation, with most, if any of the progess having been made intialy, and now with little more to show, and no end in sight.

Moving deeper however, and in the larger context, and I’d like YOU to consider this, I ‘ve more recently have been plagued by conciencence, based on the fact, that the world’s wealthiest by far, Europeanes, Aussies, Americans & Canadians, effectively wage war against the Afgani pepole, some of the poorest on earth, bar none.

It all adds up to just more of exactly the same old garbage.

And here we don’t subscribe to the usual BS of “precision guided” munitions. We routinely kill scores of civilians and non-comps. even
occasionaly our own allies and our very own troops.

http://www.buzzle.com/editorials/4-19-2002-16849.asp

Now I don’t want to sound like a preatchy peacenik, however it’s becoming increasingly apparent that this rediculously protracted occupation, and ill concieved attempt of re-engineering Afgan scociety is largely a failure.

We’re dealing with 19th and even 18th century tribal entities
and nomands, “They” maybe 100 years or more behind
western civilisation, in terms of progressive democracy, and civil rights, etc, so beit, I say at this stage, I say trade with them, let the market
invest, but leave them more or less alone, and let them catch up, on their own.

As you well know, Afganis have been at war for generations, they have little or no resourches, nothing to protect, nothing much to lose,
and fight that way.

What really did for me, and this was several years ago, was a front page news paper photo of a young Afgani boy, gawking at a gigantic unexploded penetrator, PGM, partialy embeded in the soil that landed somewhere in his neighborhood, with nothing visilble in the background except the atypical Mars like landscape.

That pretty much summed up the whole campain for me as being
yet another case of all the ususal non-sense, a thinly veiled mechcansism to test new weapons, in a low risk enviroment,
and to make a buck, while we perpetuate miltarisism .

Which brings us right up to the mess we’re in now.

MaX
Dr_Vomacton 02 Jun 2008 at 1:09 pm 41

Max, I think what happened is that you took me for an ass simply because I spoke like one…a quite understandable mistake. (I’m referring to my ill-considered comment about “kicking butt” above.) The Doctor is not always in, and when he’s out, he’s way out. There are already far too many words on this page, but let me say this: I think we fundamentally agree on the Afghanistan issue. We both felt (at least some of the time) that something must be done. We both feel that whatever it is that should have been done, it’s not what we got. Fair enough?

Peace, the Doctor is in.
Maxon 02 Jun 2008 at 2:54 pm 42

“I think what happened is that you took me for SNIP…a quite understandable mistake. ”

Not much need to explain, much less appoligise.
We’re rock’n and roll’n on this forum, generally
with an understanding, and even when not,
still making alowance and leaving the benefit of
the dougbt.

At least that’s what I expect, and reciprocate,
as much as possible.

We’ve covered territory, issues and perspectives that
none of us would dream of anywhere else.

Having said all that though, we are here to share new and different ideas, to explore every point of view, but most of all, build snowmobiles !

http://corp.brp.com/en-CA/

;0)

M
seydlitz89on 02 Jun 2008 at 5:24 pm 43

William E Odom, RIP

Soldier, Army officer, military intelligence officer, national policy adviser, scholar, strategic thinker. Of the clear Realist, Clausewitzian type . . . his brilliance will be sorely missed. Pity the land that loses its eyes.
Maxon 03 Jun 2008 at 11:11 am 44

-Up To Date & Detailed statistics on the Iraq Mis-adventure;

http://wiredispatch.com/news/?id=194198

Although casualty rates pale in comparison to the world wars,
Korea and also Vietnam.

Things ARE really starting to ADD UP.

Wounded, and those costs, in taking care of them, many for life.
Dead, and those costs. (ours)
Euipment and materials expended.
Staging this farse and those costs.
Pain and suffering inflicted, and those costs. (there’s)
Loss of prestige and respect, and those costs.
Loss of oil production and output.
Loss of funds and resourches otherwize avaliable
for domestic issues.

It’s a shame from the perspective that it was avoidable,
and entirely un-nessesary, and the USA will be forced
to continue to live and pay for this for the forseeable
future. While a few benefit and grow rich, while the rest
pick up the tab, big time.

Thanks Washington and to the American electorate.

Here’s a news flash, The “system” maybe seriously flawed ?

MaXimillian
seydlitz89on 03 Jun 2008 at 5:22 pm 45

More on William E. Odom

http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2008/06/odom.html
Maxon 03 Jun 2008 at 9:31 pm 46

Aussie News Headline, underscores Washington’s contempt for now
even our closest allies.

M

http://tinyurl.com/3nyyv9
Maxon 04 Jun 2008 at 2:52 pm 47

Revisting the commentary by Loggie and the reply’s

Dr_V

” I don’t know if dealing with it on the same scale and proportion is even enough.”

I found this article to be quite poinient, in illustration
of the overall attitude, and situation,
whereby as many have remarked that US troops,
and no matter how well intentioned on the individual and tactical scale, , are engagded
yet again under bogus pretense, and are asked
to do the impossible, under impossible circumstances.

Circumstances being that bring out the very worst in human
nature, and no matter what.

And that is a crime, and another crime that those responsible
will simply walk off stage next January, and even wealthier.

http://www.lewrockwell.com/engelhardt/engelhardt338.html

Collateral Damage

What It Really Means When America Goes to War

By Chris Hedges

Troops, when they battle insurgent forces, as in Iraq, or Gaza or Vietnam, are placed in “atrocity producing situations.” Being surrounded by a hostile population makes simple acts, such as going to a store to buy a can of Coke, dangerous. The fear and stress push troops to view everyone around them as the enemy. The hostility is compounded when the enemy, as in Iraq, is elusive, shadowy and hard to find. The rage soldiers feel after a roadside bomb explodes, killing or maiming their comrades, is one that is easily directed, over time, to innocent civilians who are seen to support the insurgents.

SNIP

Three more died today.

http://www.antiwar.com/updates/?articleid=12943

At least 53 Iraqis were killed or found dead and 72 more were injured in the latest violence. At least two mass graves were found, and a significant bombing occurred in the capital. Also, gunmen killed three American soldiers during an attack in Hawija today.
Saberstormon 07 Jun 2008 at 5:15 pm 48

Dr_Vomact, I suppose your screen name is a reference to Dr. Who?
Dr_Vomacton 07 Jun 2008 at 11:03 pm 49

Saberstorm: correct genre, but not quite a hit. Mister and Doctor Vomact was a character (actually, several) in some of the various stories of the obscure (and regrettably deceased) science fiction writer Cordwainer Smith. “Cordwainer Smith” was the nom de plume of Colonel Paul Anthony Linebarger, whose interests and accomplishments are of astonishing breadth. Among other things, he helped organize the first U.S. Army psychological warfare section, as well as the Office of War Information and the Operation Planning and Intelligence Board. Highly regarded as an orientalist, He was recalled from retirement to advise the British during their little problem in Malaya, and the U.N. forces during the Korean war.
Chicago Boyz » Blog Archive » Clausewitz Roundtable: List of Contributorson 15 Dec 2008 at 11:11 pm 50

[...] He is now involved in education. He has published two papers on Clausewitzian strategic theory, both at the DNI website. He is also involved in the theoretical application and case studying of Clausewitzian strategic [...]

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